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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
§78A-4-103(a)(2009). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Quast's petition for review argued that he Commission improperly construed the 
PTD statute, a question of law. (Quast prevailed at the Commission on factual questions.) 
The standard of revie,v is correctness for statutory construction. Provo City v. Serrano, 
2015 UT 32, ~9; 345 P.3d 1242, 1247. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
The determinative statutes in this case are: 
Utah Code §34A-2-413( l)(c)(i)-(iv)(2006): 
(c) To establish that an employee is permanently totally disabled the employee 
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: 
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed; 
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that 
limit the employee's ability to do basic work activities; 
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of 
impairments prevent the employee from performing the essential functions 
of the work activities for which the employee has been qualified until the 
time of the industrial accident or occupational disease that is the basis for 
the employee's permanent total disability claim; and 
(iv) the employee cannot perfonn other work reasonably available, taking 
into consideration the employee's: 
(A) age; 
(B) education; 
(C) past work experience; 
(D) medical capacity; and 
-2-
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(E) residual functional capacity. 
Utah Code §34A-2-413(l)(b)(iii)(2006): 
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the 
employee shall prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: 
* * * 
(iii) the industrial accident ... is the direct cause of the employee's 
permanent total disability. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
This case arises from Quast's application to the Utah Labor Commission for an award 
of permanent total disability benefits. R. 1-4. 
2. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below 
Quast' s sustained a thoracic-spine injury on May 16, 2007, while she was working for 
Huntsman. She initially filed for benefits in 2008, but the parties resolved that application 
by stipulation. Specifically, the parties stipulated that Quast's thoracic spine surgery was 
compensable. Quast developed a non-union, for which she had surgery in 2010. She filed an 
application for hearing based upon this new surgery to fix the non-union, and for permanent, 
total disability benefits. The assigned ALJ, Debbie Hann, awarded PTD and other benefits 
to Quast. Huntsman filed a motion for review. 
-3-
The Commission vacated the award, and remanded for further medical evidence, post-
surgery in 2010. Further evidence was taken, and a new ALJ, Deidre Marlow was assigned. 
Judge Marlowe concluded that the stipulation of the parties that the first thoracic spine 
surgery was work-related foreclosed the argument that the surgery to fix the non-union was 
not work-related. She again awarded PTD and other benefits, and Huntsman again filed a 
motion for review. Upon review, the Commission found that Quast was not entitled to PTD 
benefits, but affinned the decision otherwise. Quast petitioned for review to the Utah Court 
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals set aside the Commissioner's decision, and allowed the 
ALJ' s award of benefits to stand. 
3. Statement of Relevant Facts on Appeal 
The following facts are found in the Commission' s Order on Review of June 2, 2014 
(see generally R. 272-273): 
"Quast has a learning disability and dropped out of high school in the 12th grade. 
Quast's employment background consists of working as a hospital housekeeper, where she 
was required occasional heavy lifting, cleaning bathrooms, taking out the trash, washing 
walls and floors, making beds, cleaning furniture, and dusting. She has a history of urological 
problems in addition to migraines and chronic back pain. Quast has suffered various work 
injuries over the years and has been assessed with different work restrictions as a result; 
however, there is no indication that she had permanent restrictions as a result of such injuries. 
On May 16, 2007, Quast was working for Huntsman when she slipped on a wet floor 
-4-
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and fell to the ground. She underwent decompression and fusion surgery on her thoracic 
spine perfonned by Dr. Patel in July 2008. Quast and Huntsman entered into a stipulation that 
Quast sustained an "injury by accident while in the course and scope of her employment with 
[Huntsman]." The parties further agreed that the accident "permanently aggravated [Quast' s] 
pre-existing thoracic condition" and that the 2008 surgery was necessary due to the accident. 
After she was released to return to work, Quast worked for about a month before 
resigning. Quast's mid-back pain persisted after the surgery ... Quast followed up with Dr. 
Patel, who ordered a CT scan to diagnose her continued back pain. Dr. Patel diagnosed Quast 
with a nonunion in her thoracic spine at the Tl 1 level and unstable hardware installed during 
the 2008 surgery ... Dr. Patel perfonned a surgical revision later in September 2010 and 
confirmed the nonunion and failed hardware diagnosis postoperatively. 
Following the 2010 surgery, Dr. Lawrence, who took over for Dr. Patel, opined that 
Quast showed significant improvement since the last surgery and was doing well overall 
despite her complaints of continued back pain. Quast underwent another functional capacity 
evaluation in 2012 administered by Ms. Marchant, who concluded that Quast could lift 20 
pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently and still demonstrated the capacity for light 
work ... 
Quast testified that she has not attempted to find work since the 2008 surgery. 
Huntsman presented the testimony of two different vocational rehabilitation experts, Mr. 
Hiatt and Mr. Barnes, who testified that Ms. Quast could return to work as a housekeeper at 
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a hotel or an assisted living facility based on her lifting restriction. Neither Mr. Barnes nor 
Mr. Hiatt could state whether such positions required repetitive bending or reaching." (Id.). 
Both Judge Hann and Judge Marlowe found that the issue of whether the thoracic 
spine surgery in 2010 was work-related was foreclosed by the stipulation of the parties. (R. 
180-187; 222-232). The Commission agreed, and this has not been cross-appealed. (R. 274). 
Based upon Quast's thoracic spine injury, and resulting limitations, Judge Hann and Judge 
Marlowe both found her pennanently, totally disabled, and awarded PTD benefits. The 
Commission set aside that award of PTD benefits. Quast petitioned for review of that 
decision setting aside PTD benefits. Huntsman did not cross-appeal on any issues, but argued 
that the denial of benefits should be affirmed because the Commissioner's findings in favor 
of Quast were not supported by "substantial evidence". Additionally, Huntsman argued that 
the Commissioner improperly switched the burden of proof from Quast to it, on the issue of 
"other work reasonably available". 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that the Commission had improperly added an 
extra-statutory gloss on the PTD statute, i.e. whether Quast retained "a reasonable degree of 
strength and flexibility" . Without this gloss, the Commission had already found in Quast's 
favor on the explicit statutory requirements, so the Comi of Appeals simply ordered that the 
ALJ's decision awarding benefits stand. The Court of Appeals implicitly upheld the 
Commission's findings, that Quast could not perform the "essential functions" of her prior 
work, and that there was no "other work reasonably available" to her. The Court of Appeals 
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did not discuss Huntsman's claim that the Commissioner had improperly switched the burden 
of proof. Quast denied that the burden of proof had, in fact, been switched. 
Huntsman petitioned for certiorari on the question whether the Commission erred in 
adding a medical inquiry beyond whether Quast's industrial injury placed limits on her abi lity 
to perform basic work activities. It also petitioned for certiorari on the question whether the 
burden of proof had been improperly switched from Quast to it. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals con-ectly supported the Commission's decision that Quast 
suffered a "significant impairment" because it was well-supported by substantial evidence, 
Likewise, the Court of Appeals con-ectly affinned the Commission's findings that Quast 
could not return to her prior work, and had no "other work reasonably available", because 
they, too, were supported by "substantial evidence". Huntsman has not marshaled the 
evidence in favor of Quast, but relies essentially on cherry-picking its own evidence. This 
does not carry its burden of persuasion that the Commission's decision on these issues was 
unsupported by substantial evidence. 
The Commission's decision that Quast did not have an "impairment .. . that limit[s] 
[her] ability to perform basic work activities" was logically inconsistent with its conclusion 
that Quast had a "significant impairment". Further, the Commission's conclusion was 
logically inconsistent with its own findings of Quast' s work-related impairments, that Quast 
could not perform the "essential functions" of her prior work, and could not perform "other 
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work reasonably available". Instead, the Commission denied Quast on the basis of a residual 
medical capacity inquiry that the Court of Appeals correctly declared was not in the PTD 
statute, and inconsistent with it. 
The questions on certiorari seem to believe that the Commission's findings on the 
statutory elements of permanent, total disability (PTD) were against Quast. Actually, they 
were in her favor. The only issue on which Quast lost, at the Conunission, was the extra-
statutory residual medical functioning inquiry that the Court of Appeals rejected in Oliver 
v. Labor Comm 'n . If that additional medical inquiry is improper, as beyond the statute, then 
the Commission's findings in Quast's favor on the statutory elements are supported by 
"substantial evidence", and the Court of Appeals should be affirmed. 
Question on Certiorari No. 1: 
Whether the court of appeals en-ed in revers mg the Labor Commission's 
determination that Respondent had failed to demonstrate that her ability to perfonn 
basic work activities was limited? 
Answer: 
The Court of Appeals con-ectly recognized that two Administrative Law judges, and 
the Commissioner, had detennined that Quast had a "significant impairment" that 
placed a "limit on [her] ability to perform basic work activities", and properly rejected 
the Commission's creation of an additional, extra-statutory analysis, which was 
whether Quast had residual medical functional capacity at that step. 
-8-
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QUESTION ONE 
BECAUSE THE COMMISSION DETERMINED THAT QUAST SUFFERED A 
SIGNIFICANT IMPAIRMENT FROM HER INDUSTRIAL INJURY, IT 
NECESSARILY DETERMINED THAT QUAST'S ABILITY TO PERFORM 
BASIC WORK ACTIVITIES WAS LIMITED. 
A. The Commission Properly Found Quast Suffered A "Significant Impairment". 
The Commission found that Quast had a "significant impairment". Before, the Court 
of Appeals, Huntsman conceded that " [t]here is evidence to support the Commission's 
conclusion." (Brief of Respondent, p. 10.) While Huntsman asked the Court of Appeals to 
re-weigh the evidence, the Court of Appeals did not disturb the conclusion of the 
Commission that Quast suffered a "significant impairment". Huntsman has not sought 
certiorari review of this conclusion. Therefore, it is now settled that Quast has suffered a 
"significant impairment". This in turn dictates the conclusion that her impairment placed a 
"limit on [her] ability to perform basic work activities", for the reasons infra. 
B. The Commission En-oneously Treated "Significant Impairment" And "Limit [On] 
Ability To Perform Basic Work Activities" As Independent And Separate Inquiries, 
With Different Meanings. 
Both "significant impairment" and "limit on ability to perform basic work activities" 
had well-established legal meanings when the Legislature adopted the current version of the 
PTD statute, at Utah Code §34A-2-413(1995). Both phrases were richly developed in federal 
Social Security law, prior to 1995. As a general rule, when the Legislature uses a term or 
phrase with a well-established legal meaning, it is assumed to have incorporated that 
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meaning into the statutory use. "When interpreting a statute, we assume, absent a contrary 
indication, that the legislature used each term advisedly according to its ordinary and usually 
accepted meaning." Hutter v. Dig-It, Inc. , 2009 UT 69, ~ 32, 219 P.3d 918, 926. And when 
the Legislature uses a phrase with a specific legal meaning, the Utah Supreme Court assumes 
that the Legislature meant that same legal meaning. 
The legislature · is entitled to invoke specialized legal terms that carry an 
extra-ordinary meaning. And when it does so we credit the legal term of art, 
not the common understanding of the words. See Hansen, 2012 UT 9, ~ 19, 
270 P.3d 531. Thus, 11 when a word or phrase is ' transplanted from another 
legal source, whether the common law or other legislation, it brings the old soil 
with it. ' 11 Maxfield v. Herbert, 20 12 UT 44, ~ 31,284 P.3d 647 (quoting Felix 
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. 
L.REV. 527, 537 (1947)). 
State v. Canton, 2013 UT 44, ~28; 308 P .3d 517, 523. The phrases "significant impairment" 
and "limit [ on] ability to perfonn basic work activities" both have roots in the same federal 
soil, namely, the so-called "severity regulation" in Social Security law, at 20 C.F.R. § 
404.1521. This Court has previously adopted the federal understanding of subsection (b) of 
this "severity regulation" in Provo Cityv. Serrano, 2015 UT 32, ~28, 345 P.3d 1242, 1250, 
stating that we "look to identical language used in federal social security law ... ". 
Quast's case highlights the other part of the "severity regulation", or subsection (a). 
This part of the "severity regulation" is found at Utah Code §34 A-2-413 ( 1 )(b )(i). The correct 
understanding of this regulation, as codified in Utah, is drawn from the histmy of the 
"severity regulation", and the United State Supreme Court case which interpreted it, in light 
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of the Social Security Administration's statement of policy interpreting this regulation, found 
at SSR 85-28. 
SSR 85-28 gives the history of this regulation, and the intended application of it. In 
summary, the federal statute, 42 U.S.C. 423(d)(l)(A), grants benefits to a person with a 
disability of sufficient duration. 42 U.S .C. 423(d)(2)(A) then defines disability as the result 
of an impairment "of such severity" as to cause inability to work. The · phrase "of such 
severity" is not statutorily defined. In order to give some substance to the phrase, 20 C.F .R. 
§404 .15 21 was promulgated, the so-called "severity regulation" . This regulation introduced 
the notion of a threshold medical showing of limitation on ability to perfonn "basic work 
activities". The Social Security Administration sought to use this as a medical threshold, to 
dismiss claims before proceeding to adjudicate vocational issues. Due to widespread 
evidence that the "severity regulation" was being applied to deny claimants who were in fact 
unable to work due to disability, the federal comts began enjoining or limiting the use of the 
"severity regulation". Finally, the Social Security Administration issued a ruling to "clarify" 
that it intend the "severity regulation" to be used to "weed out" insubstantial claims that 
could never result of a finding of vocational disability. On the basis of this ruling, the United 
State Supreme Court upheld the validity of the "severity regulation" in Bowen v. Yukert, 482 
U.S. 137 (1987); 107 S.Ct. 2287, 96 L.Ed.2d 119, 55 USLW 4735. 
Understanding this history is important because it was demonstrates the legal meaning 
given to the phrases "significant impairment" and "limit [on] ability to perform basic work 
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activities" prior to the adoption of the Utah PTD statute in 1995. That is important because, 
in 1995, the Utah PTD statute adopted the "severity regulation" in two paiis: 
FROM THE FEDERAL SEVERITY REGULATION : 
20C.F.R. §404. 152l(a): 
"An impairment or combination of impairments is not severe if it does not significantly limit 
your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." 
TO THE UTAH PTO ST A TUTE IN 1995: 
34A-2-413(1 )(b )(i): 
From "An impairment or combination of impainnents is not severe if it does not 
significantly ... " to "significant impairment or combination of impairments .. 
. "(Emphasis added). 
34A-2-413(1)(c)(ii): 
" ... limit your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." adopted, substituting 
"the employee's" for "your". 
Utah's statutory adoption of the "severity regulation" only varies from the federal regulation 
in the placement of the modifier "significant". This change in placement does not change the 
meaning, but makes it less awkward to understand by stating it positively rather than in the 
negative. This answers the Fund' s concern that the word "limit" has no modifier, i.e., that 
even a de minimus limitation would qualify for benefits. The modifier "significant" was 
moved from its position next to "limit" and placed next to "impairment". In either position, 
it still operates to bar de minimus claims of impairment or limitation. 
-12-
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The other difference is how the Utah legislature broke the "severity regulation" into 
two halves, and placed "significant impairment" in Utah Code §34A-2-4 l 3( 1 )(b) and the rest 
of the "severity regulation" in Utah Code §34A-2-413(l)(c). This makes sense, because, as 
the "severity regulation" makes clear, it is defining "significant impairment" as an 
impairment that places a " limit [on] ability to do basic work activities." The placement of 
those two halves in the Utah PTD statute is consistent with the use of the term "permanent, 
total disability", followed by a statutory definition of that term: 
-13-
Employee Must Show: 
Elements (subsection (b )): 
Medical 
"Significant impairment" 
34A-2-413(1 )(b )(i) 
Vocational 
"Permanent, total disability" 
34A-2-413(1 )(b )(ii) 
Definitions of elements (subsection ( c )): 
"Impainnent that .. . limit the employee's 
ability to do basic work activities" 
34A-2-413(1 )( c )(ii) 
"basic work activities" defined by 
Commission Rule and 20 C.F.R. 404.1521 
"Not gainfully employed" 
34A-2-413( c )(i) 
" impairments prevent employee from 
performing essential functions" of 
historical work activities 
34A-2-413(1 )( c )(iii) 
"employee cannot perform other work 
reasonably available etc ... " 
34A-2-413( c )(iii) 
The overall point here is that, while the Utah PTD statute re-arranges the federal pieces 
somewhat, the big picture remains the same. The substantive meaning of the PTD statute is 
the same as the sequential decision-making process of Social Security, but re-arranged for 
analytic clarity. 
This now demonstrates the problem in Quast's case. The Commission found that 
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Quast met the element "significant impairment", which is now res judicata. At the same time, 
the Commission found that Quast did not meet the definition of "significant impai1ment", 
i.e., an impairment which places a "limit [ on her] ability to perfonn basic work activities." 
In other words, the Commission found Quast "significantly impaired", while at the same time 
not meeting the elements of being "significantly impaired" . 
Quast resolved this internal contradiction by looking to the sequential decision-making 
process of the Social Security Act, and the similar sequential layout of the Utah PTD statute. 
C. The Commission EtTed By Not Taking The PTD Elements In Sequential Order. 
Historically. The PTD Statute Required Sequential Decision-Making. 
As of 1991 , the predecessor to the cutTent PTD stated: 
Permanent total disability ... requires a finding by the commission of total 
disability, as measured by the substance of the sequential decision-making 
process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20 of the [C.F.R.]. 
The commission shall adopt rules that confo1m to the substance of the 
sequential decision-making process of the Social Security Administration 
under 20 C.F.R. Subsections 404.1520(b), (c), (d), (e), and (f)(l) and (2), as 
revised. 
Utah Code§ 35-1-67(1)(1991). This specifically called for sequential decision-making. 
Comparing The SSDI Sequential Decision-Making Process To The Utah PTD Statute. 
To see that the sequential substance of the SSA decision-making process has been 
codified in the 1995 PTD statute, compare the two, first decision-making process outlined 
at 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a), then Utah Code §35- l-67( 1)(c)(l995): 
Step One: "At the first step, we consider your work activity, if any. If you are doing 
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substantial gainful activity, we will find that you are not disabled." 20 C.F.R. 
404. l 520(a)( 4 )(i). 
" . . . the commission shall conclude that .. . (i) the employee is not gainfully 
employed ... ". Utah Code §35-l-67(l)(c)(i)(l995). 
Step Two: "At the second step, we consider the medical severity of your 
impairment(s). If you do not have a severe medically determinable physical 
or mental impairment that meets the duration requirement in § 404.1509 , or 
a combination of impairments that is severe and meets the duration 
requirement, we will find that you · are not disabled. 20 C.F.R. 
404. l 520(a)( 4 )(ii). 
" .. . the commission shall conclude that . . . (ii) the employee has an 
impairment or combination of impairments that limit the employee's ability to 
do basic work activities; .. . ". Utah Code §35-1 -67(1)( c)(ii)(l 995). This is the 
same thing; see infra. 
Step Three: "At the third step, we also consider the medical severity of your impairrnent(s ). 
If you have an impairrnent(s) that meets or equals one of our listings in 
appendix 1 of this subpart and meets the duration requirement, we will find 
that you are disabled." 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). 
This third step refers an applicant to the medical impairment listings. If an 
applicant meets one of these listings, he is presumed to be disabled without 
further vocational analysis. The Utah Legislature did not adopt a statutory 
counterpart to this SSA step. 
Step Four: "At the fourth step, we consider our assessment of your residual functional 
capacity and your past relevant work. If you can still do your past relevant 
work, we will find that you are not disabled." 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). 
" . . . the commission shall conclude that . . . (iii) the industrial or occupationally 
caused impairment or combination of impairments prevent the employee from 
performing the essential functions of the work activities for which the 
employee has been qualified until the time of the industrial accident . . . 
Utah Code §35-l-67(l)(c)(iii)(1995). 
Step Five: "At the fifth and last step, we consider our assessment of your residual 
-16-
• 
• 
• 
functional capacity and your age, education, and work experience to see 
if you can make an adjustment to other work. If you can make an adjustment 
to other work, we will find that you are not disabled. If you cannot make an 
adjustment to other work, we will find that you are disabled." 20 C.F.R. 
404. l 520(a)( 4)(v). 
" ... the commission shall conclude that ... (iv) the employee cannot perform 
other work reasonably available, taking into consideration the employee's age, 
education, past work experience, medical capacity, and residual 
functional capacity. Utah Code §35-l-67(l)(c)(iv)(l995). 
Note that for cases arising before 1995, the Commission has explicitly adopted the SSA 
sequential decision-making regulations in UT Admin. Code R612-200-5B. Permanent Total 
Disability. 
Quast argued to the Court of Appeals that the Commission, by finding that she met 
the vocational requirements of the PTD statute, necessarily met the medical impairment 
threshold. This is consistent with SSR 85-28, which points out that: 
By definition, basic work activities are the abilities and aptitudes necessary to 
do most jobs. In the absence of contrary evidence, it is reasonable to conclude 
that an individual whose impairments do not preclude the performance ofbasic 
work activities is, therefore, able to perform his or her past relevant work. 
SSR 85-28. The converse is true also: if a worker is unable to perform "past relevant work" 
and cannot perf01m "other work reasonably available", they must necessarily have a 
significant impairment that limits the ability to perf01m "basic work activities".' 
1Huntsman argues that the absence of direct incorporation of federal law into 
Section 413 precludes reference to established legal meaning of specific words or 
phrases. This contradicts the Commission's adoption of the federal meaning of the phrase 
"basic work activities", and the Court's reference to regulations in Provo City v. Serrano. 
-1 7-
D. The Court Of Appeals Correctly Rejected The Commission's Attempt To Read Extra-
Statutory Burdens Into The PTD Statute. 
The Court of Appeals correctly refused to read the "severity regulation", as adopted 
in the Utah PTD statute, as requiring anything more than a showing that an impairment 
placed a " limit [on] ability to perform basic work activities." In Quast's case, that meant a 
showing that her industrial medical impairment limited her ability to walk, stand, sit, lift, 
bend or twist, which are all "basic work activities". Her medical records clearly established 
that she had these limitations, on an industrial basis. The Commission' s finding that Quast 
had a "significant impairment" confinned this, and was supported by substantial evidence. 
The Commission went beyond this, to consider whether, despite these limitations, she 
"still has a reasonable degree of strength and flexibility". This inquiry into what Quast retains 
AFTER her industrial limitations is exactly contrary to the statute. The "significant 
impairment" inquiry is a threshold inquiry at the start, not an analysis of what is left over at 
the end of the inquiry. 
The apparent reason that the Commission felt the need to add additional statutory 
language is to respond to the concern of the Fund that the word " limit" is without "limit", so 
to speak. This concern is gone if one understands that the word " limit" is " limited" by the 
modifier "significant" in both the Social Security program and the Utah Act. In the Social 
Security Act, the modifier "significant" appears in the regulation interpreting the statutory 
words "such severity". I.e., for Social Security, an impairment is "severe" if it "significantly 
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limit[s] your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." In the Utah Act, the 
modifier "significant" appears in the statute itself, ( 1 )(b ), "significant impainnent". ( 1 )( c )(ii) 
defines the ,;,,,ord "significant" as "an impairment[ ... ] that limit[s] the employee's ability to 
do basic work activities." See discussion supra. 
If one does not understand that (1 )( c )(ii) is a definition of (1 )(b ), then there is no 
. 
"limit" to the concept of a "limit". But if one understands that (l)(c)(ii) is a definition of 
"significant impairment", then the definition is modified by the word "significant" in ( 1 )(b ), 
or incorporated into it. Additionally, the federal usage of the phrase, and the context of the 
sequential decision-making of the Utah PTD both place a "limit" on the concept of "limit". 
They illuminate the meaning. There is no need for confusion. 
The Court of Appeals correctly treated "limit ... basic work activities" as a medical 
question, not a vocational question. And it correctly evaluated the limitations that Quast' s 
injuries had on her ability to perform basic work activities. It correctly concluded that the 
undisputed medical evidence found by the Commissioner pointed without question to a 
conclusion that Quast suffered a "significant impainnent", i.e., a "limit [ of her] ability to do 
basic work activities." The Comi of Appeals correctly rejected this attempt to read an extra-
statutory burden into the PTD statute, a burden that went beyond a "limit [on] ability to 
perform basic work activities."2 
2The Court of Appeals overstated its holding in one sentence: "There is no 
qualitative restriction before a finding of "limited" can be made." Quast, at 19. The 
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QUESTION TWO 
Question on Certiorari No. 2: 
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that substantial evidence did not 
support the Commission's conclusions. 
Answer: 
As to whether Quast suffered a "significant impairment", that issue is 
addressed supra. The Commission found that Quast suffered a "significant 
impainnent", and Huntsman conceded on appeal that evidence supported this. The 
Court of Appeals correctly refused to re-weigh the evidence on this point. The 
Commission erroneously went beyond this. 
As to whether Quast was prevented by her "significant impairments" from 
"performing the essential functions" of her prior work, two ALJ sand the Commission 
concluded that Quast was unable to return to her prior work as a housekeeper. This 
conclusion was supported by substantial evidence, as the Court of Appeals correctly 
recognized. Huntsman did not seek ce1iiorari on this issue, and did not brief it. Quast 
does not understand this to be in dispute, on certiorari. As explained supra, this 
finding alone requires the conclusion that Quast met the medical severity threshold. 
The Commission's conclusion was that Quast was w1able to do "other work 
qualitative restriction is that a limitation be "significant", i.e. , more than minimal, 
consistent with the "severity regulation" as well as S.S.R. 85-28. 
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reasonably available". That conclusion was supported by substantial evidence, as the 
Court of Appeals c01Tectly recognized. Huntsman did not seek certiorari on the 
question whether substantial evidence supported the findings by two ALJs and the 
Commission that Quast was unable to return to other work reasonably available. As 
to the burden of proof question on this issue, see infra. Regardless of whether the 
legal burden of proof issue was preserved or harmless error, the finding itself was 
supported by substantial evidence. 
QUESTION THREE 
HUNTSMAN FAILED TO PROPERLY PRESERVE ITS OBJECTION 
TO THE COM:MISSION'S USE OF "BURDEN OF SHOWING" 
Question on Certiorari No. 3: 
Whether the court of appeals erred in accepting the Commission's statement regarding 
burdens of proof with respect to the question of the availability of other work and in 
declining to treat Petitioner's challenge to that statement as an alternate ground for 
affirmance. 
Answer to Question No. 3: 
This issue was not properly preserved below. Given the lack of preservation, it is 
unclear exactly what the Commissioner meant when discussing the "burden" imposed 
on Huntsman. Quast presumes that the Commissioner was familiar with Martinez v. 
Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT 42; 164 P.3d 384, which placed the ultimate burden 
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of proof on the worker. Quast therefore assumes that the Commissioner was refen-ing 
to the burden of going forward, after Quast's primafacie showing of inability to do 
"other work reasonably availab le". Or possibly the Conunissioner meant the burden 
of persuasion in overturning the findings of two different ALJs on that issue. Either 
conclusion would be justified. Because Huntsman failed to preserve this issue by 
asking the Commissioner what she meant, all one can do at this point is speculate. 
A. The Commissioner Meant The Burden Of Going Forward, To Rebut Quast's Prima 
Facie Showing Of Permanent Total Disability. 
The Commissioner did not say the "burden of proof' was on Huntsman, despite the 
phrasing of the question on certiorari. She merely said, Huntsman's "burden of showing". 
This is no small distinction. The "burden of showing", in other words, going forward, arises 
after the party with the burden of proof makes aprimafacie case: 
A prima facie case has been made when evidence has been received at trial 
that, in the absence of contrary evidence, would entitle the party having the 
burden of proof to judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g., State v. Wood, 2 
Utah 2d 34, 38, 268 P.2d 998, 1001 (1954). 
Bair v. Axiom Design, LLC, 2001 UT 20, 1114; 20 P.3d 388, 392. 
Quast made an initial showing suffic ient to persuade both ALJs and the Conunission 
that there was no "other work reasonably available" . See e.g., 1/31/14 Order on Remand, p. 
8. In the absence of contrary evidence, Quast would have been entitled to a decision in her 
favor, as a matter of law. Bair, supra. Huntsman attempted to factually rebut this by calling 
vocational witnesses, to testify that Quast could indeed work as a housekeeper, despite her 
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limitations. The ALJ and the Commission found that Huntsman fa iled to pull off this factual 
offer of proof, i.e. , failed its burden of showing what it set out to prove. Huntsman had no 
obligation to call any vocational witnesses at all, and could have chosen to rely solely upon 
Quast's ability to cany her legal burden of proof. This strategy ran the risk of losing, given 
Quast's compelling evidence. Rather than place all its eggs in that basket, Huntsman 
affirmatively offered vocational evidence, which was not persuasive, in ·opposing Quast's 
proof. The Commissioner undoubtedly meant nothing more. 
B. Huntsman Failed To Cany Its Burden Of Persuasion On Administrative Review, That 
Two Different ALJs Erred In Concluding That Quast Could Not Perform "Other 
Work Reasonably Available". 
Alternatively, the Commissioner may have meant that Huntsman failed to cany its 
"burden" of persuasion to reverse the findings of fact and conclusions of law of Judge 
Marlowe, and Judge Hann, including the finding that Quast could not "perform other work 
reasonably available". Upon this administrative review, the Commissioner reviewed a "cold" 
evidentiary record. The statutory basis for this administrative review is Utah Code §630-4-
30 I (2008). This statute does not contain any statement of the standard of review that the 
Commission should use in reviewing findings of fact by the ALJ. Courts across the country 
vary on this question, often depending on the specific language of the workers compensation 
system. See generally, Larson, Workmen's Compensation §130.03D[3], listing the various 
approaches by jurisdiction. California's approach gives recognition to the fact that the 
Commission reviews a "cold" record, whereas the ALJ has first-hand opportunity to view the 
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testimony of the witnesses: 
When the WCJ's finding is supported by solid, credible evidence, it is to be 
accorded great weight by the Board and should be rejected only on the basis 
of contrary evidence of considerable substantiality; and the WCJ's findings on 
credibility are entitled to great weight because the WCJ has the opportunity to 
observe the demeanor of the witnesses and weigh their statements in 
connection with their manner on the stand. 
Rubalcava v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. , 220 Cal.App.3d 901,269 Cal.Rptr. 656 (2d Dist., 
4th Div. 1990). This approach is sound, and should be adopted, in reviewing the 
Commission's decision to endorse or reject the decisions of ALJs. 
Where the decision being reviewed relies upon first-hand encounter with facts and 
other matters not "adequately reflected in the record available to appellate comis", State v. 
Levin, 2006 UT 50, ~25, 144 P.3d 1096, deference is required. On the other hand, where, as 
here, "the appellate court is in as good a position as the trial court to resolve the issue", non-
deferential review is appropriate. In Re Baby B, 2012 UT 35, ~43, 308 P.3d 394. The Levin 
factors referred to in In Re Baby B were elaborated upon in a companion case, Sawyer v. 
Dep't of Worliforce Serv., 2015 UT 33. There, the Court stated that the standard of review 
was trending toward a "binary" result: fact-like detenninations receive deferential review, 
and law-like determinations receive de novo review. If it is appropriate for the appellate 
courts to give deference to trial courts who actually face the witnesses, it is appropriate for 
the Commissioner to give deference to the findings of fact made by ALJs who actually face 
and evaluate witnesses. 
-24-
• 
• 
Quast relied upon the evidentiary facts found by Judge Hann and Judge Marlowe. It 
is reasonable to conclude that, upon administrative review, the Commission, giving deference 
to the ALJs fact-finding, found that Huntsman had failed to carry its burden of persuasion 
that these two ALJs, who had the opportunity to eyeball the witnesses, had gotten it wrong. 
Both AL.Ts specifically held Quast to the ultimate burden of proof on all elements of PTD, 
in accord withMartinezv. Media-Paymaster. Both AL.Ts found that Quast carried that burden 
of proof on all elements, including proof that she could not "perform other work reasonably 
available" . The Commission declined to disturb these conclusions, granting deference to the 
AL.Ts on disputed issues of credibility and face-to-face evaluation of witnesses. 
C. Any Error By The Commissioner In Describing The Burden Of Proof Is Harmless. 
Quast believes this entire issue to be a red herring, because there was no evidence in 
the record to conclude otherwise than how the Commissioner did. In other words, there was 
no contrary evidence that Quast could do other work reasonably available. The ALJs both 
made specific findings of fact that Quast's employment with Huntsman did involve bending 
and twisting. Huntsman's vocational witnesses did not know whether Quast's limitations on 
bending or twisting would preclude her from other work as a housekeeper. They offered only 
other housekeeping and light assembly as other vocational possibilities. But they were 
unfamiliar with the specific physical demands of those jobs. The Commissioner herself 
stated that Huntsman's experts "did not sufficiently address her restriction against repetitive 
bending of the spine", and rejected that testimony. (Order on Motion for Review, p. 7). Judge 
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Marlowe found that Huntsman's expert "did not knov,1 the specific job tasks" for other 
housekeeping work. She found that Huntsman's experts "were not aware of the specific job 
requirements for [light assembly work] and was (sic] unable to provide any details as to the 
physical requirements of these jobs other than meeting [Quast' s] lifting weight restrictions." 
(J. Marlowe Findings and Conclusions, p. 8-9). On that basis, the ALJs and the 
Commissioner discounted those vocational witnesses entirely. This left no evidence in the 
record to conclude that there was any "other work reasonably available" to Quast, and an 
abundance of evidence that there was no "other work reasonably available". Regardless of 
who had the burden of proof, there was no evidence of other work reasonably available to 
Quast. On the other hand, there was ample evidence that Quast could not do other work, as 
both ALJs and the Commissioner concluded. 
The "substantial evidence" that Huntsman argues supports a finding that Quast had 
"other work reasonably available" is its own vocational witnesses. (Petitioner' s Brief on 
Certiorari, p. 18). However, this is same evidence that both ALJs and the Commissioner 
rejected. Quast is not able to understand how evidence rejected by both ALJs and the 
Commissioner can be "substantial evidence" to supp01t the Commission's conclusion. 
For Huntsman to show that the Commissioner's statement on burden was not 
hannless, it would have to marshal the facts , to the extent necessary to persuade the Comt 
of Appeals or this Court that there was some other conclusion that could have been reached 
on this record. Huntsman has not attempted this marshaling, but merely relies upon an 
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alleged inconect legal statement of burden of proof. All one needs to do is read the facts 
recited in the ALJs' rulings and the Commissioner' s decision, to realize why Huntsman has 
not marshaled the factual record: 
[Quast] also has a very limited intellectual functioning. [Quast] was not able 
to complete high school even with the assistance of special education. [Quast] 
has a limited ability to read, write, understand math or to learn. [Quast] also 
suffer from a developmental disability. [Quast] received special education and 
dropped out of high school in the 12th grade. [Quast] testified she suffers from 
dyslexia, which causes her to read things upside down or backwards. 
* * * 
[Quast] is 39 years old and dropped out of high school in 12th grade. [Quast] 
was in special education classes in high school and suffers from a learning 
disability. [Quast's] work experience is as a hospital housekeeper. As a result 
of the [industrial injury], she is restricted to lifting no more than 20 pounds and 
must avoid any repetitive flexion and extension of the thoracic spine. [Quast] 
also has limited intellectual abilities. [Quast' s] work history is unskilled labor. 
As a result, she does not possess transfenable work skills. 
ALJ (Marlowe), Findings of Fact, p. 6-8.3 Quast has an IQ that ranges from 55-60, to at most, 
70. (R. 47-48, 181,228). The Commissioner did not find that Quast had transferrable work 
skills, nor did Huntsman ever argue that there were any. Quast's intellectual and learning 
disabilities were undisputed. Her work history was undisputed. On this record, no other 
conclusion could have been drawn but that Quast was totally disabled. 
3Huntsman' s doctor stated that Quast retained "full functional range of motion in her 
entire spine." Order on Review, p. 7. This is a medical impossibility. Quast's spine is fused from 
T7-T12. (J. Marlowe, FF/CL, p. 6). This makes it anatomically impossible to bend or twist her 
back normally. Further, Quast has a 22% impairment of her spine. (Id.) It is not possible to have 
"full functional range of motion in her entire spine" with a 22% impairment. 
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Anyway, any error in understanding the burden of proof would not constitute an 
alternate ground for affirmance of the denial of benefits. Remand here would be pointless, 
because the record contains no evidence there was any other work reasonably available to 
Quast, given her intellectual and physical limitations. Any error was harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the Commission's conclusions in favor of 
Quast on the statutory elements of PTD, because they were supported by "substantial 
evidence". Specifically, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the Commissioner' s 
conclusion that Quast suffered a "significant impairment". This necessarily meant that Quast 
had a "limit [ on her] ability to perform basic work activities." The Court of Appeals correctly 
rejected the Commission's use of an extra-statutory residual medical functioning inquiry, 
which does not logically connect to the initial "severity" inquiry, as codified by the Utah PTD 
statute. Remaining medical functioning might justify a re-employment effort, after a finding 
of PTD, but it makes no sense to apply this as a bar to an initial finding of PTD. The Court 
of Appeals correctly affirmed the Commission's finding that Quast could not perform the 
" essential functions" of her prior housekeeping employment was supported by "substantial 
evidence". Finally, the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the Commissioner's conclusion 
that the record supported the ALJ s' conclusion that Quast could not perform any "other work 
reasonably available", and that Huntsman had failed to rebut Quast's primafacie showing. 
The Commission is using the statutory requirement that a worker show impairments 
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that " limit the employee 's ability to perform basic work activities" as a roadblock to deny 
benefits to workers otherwise unable to participate in the workforce. This distorts the 
accepted legal meaning of this plu·ase. This Court has clearly stated that terms with specific 
legal meanings in the Social Security context are to be given those same meanings under 
state law. This phrase, which is the definition of "significant impairment", is a minimal, 
threshold showing of medical impainnent. It is not some super-disability category. The 
United States Supreme Court noted that every federal circuit had rejected the similar use of 
this phrase to deny persons who were actually disabled. The SSA issued SSR 85-28 to 
"clarify" that it would only use the limitation on "basic work activities" as a threshold 
screening test, to weed out applicants who could not show disability due to a minimal 
medical impairment. This usage was well-understood when Utah adopted the PTD statute in 
1995. 
Quast is precluded by her injury from participation in the work force, either her prior 
work, or "other work reasonably available". The Commission has created some super-
disability standard, that goes beyond inability to participate in the labor force. This goes 
beyond the statutory requirements. The Court of Appeals correctly rejected the Commission's 
extra-statutory standard, and remanded for entry of an Order of pennanent, total disability 
benefits, in accordance with the decisions of Judge Hann, Judge Marlowe, and the 
Commission's own finding that Quast cannot return to prior work and there is no other work 
"reasonably available". The Court of Appeals should be affinned. 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, And Order, March 10, 2011. 

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
ADJUDICATION DIVISION 
Heber M Wells Building, 3rd Floor 
160 E 300 S, 3rd Fl 
Salt Lake City UT 84114 
(801) 530-6800 
RASHELL QUAST, 
Petitioner, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER 
vs. 
Case No. 10-0208 
UNIVERSITY OF UT AH HUNTSMAN 
CANCER HOSPITAL and/or WORKERS Judge Debbie L. Hann 
COMPENSATION FUND, 
Respondent. 
HEARING: Labor Commission, 160 E 300 S, Salt Lake City, UT 8411.4-6615, Room -
332 on January 27, 2011 at 8:00 AM. Said_He~ing was pursuantto Qrder 
and Not1ce of the Commission. · 
. .. 
BEFORE: · pebbie L. Hann, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The petitioner, Rashell Quast, was present and represeI?-ted by her attorney 
· Kevin Robson Esq. 
The respondents, University of Utah Huntsman Cancer Hospital and 
Workers Compensation Fund, were represented by attorney Hans 
Scheffler Esq. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The petitioner's March 22, 2010 Application for Hearing alleges entitlement to medical 
expenses, recommcmded ·medical care, temporary total disability compensation, temporary partial 
disability compensation, permanent partial disability compensation, permanent total disability 
compensation and·interest. The Commission began a formal adjudication of the petitioner's 
claim on March 24, 2010 with an Order for Answer. · 
The respondents' April 26, 2010 Answer admits the petitioner was injured by accident on the 
date alleged and that she suffered injuries consistent with the parties' stipulation, approved by 
the Commission on .January 8, 2009. The respondents denied that the petitioµer is entitled to any 
additional compensation or medical treatment or that she is permanently totally disabled as the 
result of the industrial accident. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
Rashell Quast vs. University of Utah Huntsman Cancer Hospital and/or Workers Compensation 
Fund Case No. 10-0208 
Page 2 
At the hearing, the petitioner withdrew her claims for temporary compensation because 
compensation was paid through March 19, 2010. The petitioner requested permanent total 
disability compensation beginning March 19, 2010 and payment for the September 2010 back 
surgery and ongoing treatment. 
The respondents agreed, based upon the January 8, 2009 Stipulation and Order issued in Case 
No. 08-0988, that the petitioner's May 16, 2007 industrial accident caused a pennanent 
aggravation of her pre-existing back condition. The respondents disputed that the petitioner is 
permanently totally disabled as the result of this accident and that it is not the direct cause of her 
inability to work. 
The parties stipulated the petitioner's compensation rate for this claim is $282.00 per week. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The petitioner was injured by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with 
the respondent, University of Utah Huntsman Cancer Hospital on May 16, 2007 which resulted 
in a permanent aggravation of her pre-existing thoracic condition resulting in a decompression 
and fusion surgery _on July 1, 2008. (Exhibit R2). 
The petitioner is not gainfully employed. The petitioner returned to her job and attempted to 
work for about 1.5 months after her July 2008 surgery. The petitioner was .unable to physically 
perfo1m her job duties as a housekeeper for the respondent. The petitioner's last day worked was 
two months and 3 weeks prior to her September 7, 2010 surgery which would have been June 17,,. 
2010. This surgery was performed to repair the petitioner?s non-union from the July 1, 2008 
surgery. Medical exhibit 141, 874-877. 
The petitioner has a significant impairment. The petitioner's thoracic spin_e is fused from T7-
T12. She is now limited to lifting 20 pormds and must avoid any repetitive flexion or extension 
of her thoracic spine. The petitioner's :thoracic spine condition has been rated at 22% whole 
person, of which 12% is due to the May 16, 2007 industrial accident. The petitioner also suffers 
from a developmental disability. The petitioner received special education and dropped out of 
high school in the 12th grade.1 The petitioner testified she suffers from dyslexia, which causes 
her to read things· upside down or backwards. The petitioner also suffered from chronic pain and 
depression prior to the industrial accident. The petitioner was also born with ~derdeveloped 
kidneys and now bas only one kidney. The petitioner had bilateral upper extremity pain which 
has been surgically treated. She also suffers from migraines. 
1Although-not presented as an exhibit at the hearing, attached to the petitioner's Application for Hearing is a copy of 
the February 17, 2010 Not!ce of Attorney Advisor Decision-Fully Favorable which granted the petitioner Social 
Security Disability benefits on the basis of her thoracic spine condition and borderline intellectual functioning. The 
decision notes that psychological testing conducted as part of the Social Security evaluation revealed below average 
intellectual functioning, including a full scale intelligence quotient score of only 70. This evidence must be 
addressed in any subsequent proceedings related to re-employment. 
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The petitioner has a limited ability to do basic work. The petitioner suffers from a 22% whole 
person impairment of her thoracic spine which limits her ability to lift more than 20 pounds or to 
flex or extend her thoracic spine. The petitioner also has a very limited intellectual functioning. 
The petitioner was not able to complete high school even with the assistance of special 
education. The petitioner has a limited ability to read, write, understand math or to learn. The 
combination of the petitioner's physical and intellectual limitations limit her ability to perform 
basic work activities. 
The petitioner's thoracic back condition as the result of the May 16, 2007 industrial accident 
prevents her from performing the essential functions of the basic work activities for which she 
was qualified to perform at the time of industrial accident. The petitioner has worked as a 
housekeeper in hospitals for about 20 years. The petitioner was required to lift 50-70 pounds, 
clean bathrooms, wash walls, clean furniture, mal<e and clean beds, sweep and mop floors and 
dust. HousekeeP,ing in a hospital setting is medium level physical demand work. The 
petitioner's work restriction of no lifting over 20 pounds alone takes her out of this category of 
work. The petitioner has no other work experience. 
The petitioner is 39 years old a:hd dropped out of high school in 12th grade. The petitioner was iri. 
special education t:lasses in high school and suffers from-a learning disaqility. The petitioner's 
work experience is as a hospital housekeeper. As a result of the May 1 p, 2007 accident, she is 
restricted ·to lifting no more than 20 pounds and must avoid any repetitive flexion and extension 
of her thoracic spine. The petitioner also has limited intellectual abilities. . 
The petitioner's work history 1s unskilled labor. As a result, she does not possess any 
transferrable work· skills. 
Mike Hyatt, the respondents' vocational expert, believes the petitioner can perform work as a 
hotel/motel housel<;eeper because it meets the light category of work which is the category of 
-work that does-not require lifting over 20 pounds. 
Working as a hotel/motel housekeeper would require the petitioner to change linens, strip and 
make beds, vacuum, clean bathrooms, empty garbage cans and dust. Stripping a bed requires the 
blanket and cover to be pulled off and the sheets and pillow cases removed. The majority of 
hotels and motels do not utilize fitted sheets, requiring extra bending at the thpracic level to fold 
corners when making the bed with fresh linens. Cleaning bathrooms requires the petitioner to 
mop floors and clean the sinks and counter at waist level requiring bending at the thoracic level. 
Cleaning over sink mirrors also requires reaching upward and forward. Most hotel/motel 
bathrooms contain a tub/shower combination that requires reaching and bending with the upper 
body to clean. Cleaning a toilet also requires bending and reaching of the upper body. 
Vacuuming carpet requires movement of more than the arm maneuvering the vacuum. This ~k 
too requires flexion and extension of the thoracic spine. A hotel/motel housekeeper is required 
to clean many rooms a day at a quick pace. Although the lifting requirements are 20 pounds or 
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less, the majority of tasks a hotel/motel housekeeper performs require repetitive extension and 
flexion of the thoracic spine. The job of hotel/motel housekeeper would require the petitioner to 
engage in repetitive flexion and extension of her thoracic spine and exceeds her medical 
restrictions as the result of the May 16, 2007 industrial accident. 
Paul Barnes, the respondent's vocational expert believes the petitioner can perform a job at 
Avalon Health Care, an assisted living home for veterans, as a housekeeper. Mr. Barnes did not 
know the specific job tasks other than having past experience and being able to read, write and 
follow oral and written directions. An assisted living home would have bedrooms and 
bathrooms where the residents live that a housekeeper would clean. The housekeeping tasks 
would be the same or similar to that of a hotel/motel housekeeper. Based upon the above 
findings related to hotel/motel housekeeping, a housekeeper in an assisted living home would 
require repetitive flexion and extension of the petitioner's thoracic spine and exceed her work 
restrictions as the result of the May 16, 2007 industrial accident. 
Mr. Barnes also opined that the petitioner could engage in light assembly work assembling light 
medical plastics and that job openings exist Optima Consulting and Integra Life Sciences. Mr. · 
Barnes was not aware of the specific job requirements for these jobs and was unable to provide 
any details as to-th~ physical requirements of these jobs other than meeting the petitioner's lifting 
weight limitation. • In identifying light housekeeping and light assembly work as other work the 
petitioner could perform, Mr. Hyatt agreed that bending and reaching is not always noted in the 
Dictionary_of Occupational Titles, which formed the basis of his opinion. The undersigned finds 
that most assembly work requires rapid reaching and bending Qf the upper back to assemble 
parts, either at a work station table or an assembly line. Neither Mr. Barnes nor Mr. Hyatt 
described the jobs they identified as not having this requirement. 
The other work identified by the respondents does not meet the petitioner's work limitation of 
having to avoid any repetitive flexion and extension of her thoracic spine. 
The petitioner cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into consideration her age, 
educ~tion, past woik experience, medical capacity and residual functional capacity. · 
The petitioner has very limited intellectual abilities and her work history is dominated by one 
task: cleaning. Although the petitioner suffered from many conditions, including depression, 
chronic pain, including neck and back pain, migraines, incontinence, upper extremity pain and 
other ailments, she continued to do her work as a hospital hous'ekeeper, classified as medium 
level physical demand work, until the May 16, 2007 industrial accident. The petitioner also tried 
to return to her work as a housekeeper following treatment for her injuries as the result of this 
accident but was not successful due to her physical ·limitations following the thoracic fusion 
surgery. The petitioner did not have physical restrictions that prevented her from performing her 
job duties until the May 16, 2007 industrial accident. The petitioner's January 26, 2007 
industrial injury is direct cause of the petitioner's permanent total disability 
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The petitioner is preliminarily permanently totally disabled as the result of the May 16, 2007 
industrial accident beginning June 18, 2010, when the petitioner was no longer able to work as 
the result of his thoracic spine condition. 
Based upon the parties' stipulation, the he petitioner's permanent total disability compensation 
rate for the May 16, 2007 date of injury is $282.00 per week. 
The petitioner is entitled to payment of medical expenses related to her September 7, 2010 
thoracic surgery to repair the non-union from the prior surgery. There is no dispute that the 
petitioner suffered a non-union. Both Dr. Patel and Dr. Newton agree on this point. Although 
Dr. Newton opined that it was not "an urgency" he has not opined the surgery was not necessary 
to treat this condition. 
PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 requires compensation be paid only for those injuries arising out of 
and in the course of employment. For an injury to be compensable under the Act, a petitioner 
must show by evidence, opinion or otherwise that the stress, strain or exertion required by his or 
her occupation led to the resulting injury or disability and in the event a petitioner cannot show a 
medical causal connection, compensation should be denied. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 
729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). 
Utah Code§ 34A-2-413 state~ in relevant part: 
(1) (a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from an industrial accident or 
occupational disease, the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this section. 
· (b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the employee 
niust prove by a preponderance·of evidence that: . 
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of impairments as 
· a result of the industrial accident or occupational disease that gives rise to the permanent 
total disability entitlement; · 
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and 
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct cause of the 
employee's permanent total disability. 
(c) To establish that an employee is permanently totally disabled the employee must 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: 
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed; 
(ii) the employee has an impairment-or combination of impairments that limit the 
employee's ability to do basic work activities; 
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of impairments 
prevent the employee from performing the essential functions of the work activities for 
which the employee has been qualified until the time of the industrial accident or 
occupational disease that is the basis for the employee's permanent total disability claim; 
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and 
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, tal<ing into 
consideration the employee's: 
(A) age; 
(B) education; 
(C) past work experience; 
(D) medical capacity; and 
(E) residual functional capacity. 
* * * * 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The petitioner suffered a compensable industrial accident on May 16, 2007 while employed by 
the respondent, University of Utah Huntsman Cancer Hospital. 
The petitioner is tentatively permanently totally disabled as the result of the May 16, 2007 
industrial accident. 
The respondents, University of Utah Huntsman Cancer Hospital and Workers .Compensation 
Fund, are liable to the petitioner for permanent total disability compensation at the rate of 
$282.00 per week beginning June 18, 2010 and continuing until further order of the Commission. 
The respondents, University of Utah Huntsman Cancer Hospital and Workers Compensation 
Fund, are liable to the petitioner for.treatment of her thoracic spine condition, including payment 
for the September 7, 2010 surgery, pursuant to the Commission RBRVS fee schedule plus 
interest 'at the rate of 8% per annum. 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondents, University of Utah Huntsman Cancer 
Hospital and Workers Compensation Fµ.n,d, pay the petitioner subsistence benefits at the rate of 
$282.00 per week beginning June 18, 2010 and continuing until further order of the Coi;nmission. 
Those amounts accrued to date are due and payable in a lump sum plus interest at the rate of 8% 
'• • J 
per annum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that statutory attorneys' fees shall be paid directly to Paniel F. 
Bertch Esq, 'according to Utah Code § 34A-1-309 and Utah Administrative Code, Rule 602-2-4. 
That amount shall be deducted from petitioner's award and sent directly to Mr. Bertch's office. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents, University of Utah Huntsman Cancer 
Hospital and Workers Compensation Fund, pay the petitioner for necessary medical treatment 
incurred to treat her thoracic spine condition as the result of the industrial accident, including, 
~ 
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but not limited to, the September 7, 2010 surgery, pursuant to the Commission RBRVS fee 
schedule, plus interest at the rate of 8% per annum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents, University of Utah Huntsman Cancer 
Hospital and Workers Compensation Fund, notify the Commission in writing within 30 day of 
the date of this order whether a re-employment plan shall be submitted. If the respondents elect 
to submit a re-employment p lan within 30 days of the date of this order, the re-employment plan 
shall be submitted to the Commission within 90 days of the date of this order. 
DATED this {if;ay o~~, 2011. 
Debbie L. Hann 
Administrative Law Judge 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication Division 
of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific pasis for 
review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this 9ecisi9n is 
signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review within 20 days 
of the date of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct the 
foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its 
respons_e. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will 
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner. 
Rashell Quast vs. University of Utah Huntsman Cancer Hospital and/or Workers Compensation 
Fund Case No. I 0-0208 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a tme and correct copy of the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order, was mailed by prepaid U.S. postage on March 10, 2011, to the persons/parties at the 
following addresses: 
Rashel I Quast 
3831 S Hummingbird 
Salt Lake City UT 84123 
University of Utah Huntsman Cancer Hospital 
2000 Cir Of Hope 
Salt Lake City UT 84112 
Workers Compensation Fund 
Dennis V Lloyq Designated Agent 
100 W Towne Ridge Pkwy 
Sandy UT 84070 
Daniel F Bertch Esq 
1996 E 6400 S Ste 100 
Salt Lake City UT 84121 
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Workers Compensation Fund Legal Dept 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
ADJUDICATION DIVISION 
Heber M. Wells Building, 3rd Floor 
160 E. 300 S., 3rd Fl. 
P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
(801) 530-6800 
RASHELL QUAST, 
Petitioner, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER UPON REMAND 
vs. 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HUNTSMAN 
CANCER HO SPIT AL; WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION FUND, 
Respondents. 
Hearing: August 7, 2012 
Appearances: 
Case No. 10-0208 
Judge Deidre Marlowe 
Daniel F. Bertch for the Petitioner 
Hans Scheffler for the Respondents 
PROCEEDINGS 
The Petitioner originally filed a claim with the Adjudication Division on August 13, 
2008 regarding a May 16, 2007 industrial injury. That adjudication was assigned Case No. 
08-0988. The parties did not participate in a hearing but resolved that case through a 
stipulation. 
In the stipulation the parties agreed that the Petitioner had sustained an injury by 
accident while in the course and scope of her employment with the University ofUtah oµ 
May 16, 2007 when she slipped and fell onto the floor, sustaining injuries to her mid-back, 
left knee and left hip. More specifically, the pc1rties agreed ttiat the Petitioner's pre-existing 
thoracic injury was aggravated by the industrial accident and that decompression surgery 
on July 1, 2008 was necessitated by the accident. Respond~nts agreed to continue paying 
any medical expenses necessitated by the accident. Respondents also agreed to pay 
temporary total compensation from June 30, 2008 to September 17, 2008 and from 
October 28, 2008 until the Petitioner became medically stable. The parties agreed that the 
appropriate compensation weekly rate is $282.00. 
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The parties also stipulated that there was no treatment necessary at the time for the 
Petitioner's left knee and left hip, and that all medical expenses had been paid for those 
claimed injuries to that date. The parties further stipulated that the Petitioner's urology 
problems were not medically causally related to the industrial accident, and that the 
Respondents were not liable for the Petitioner's narcotic medications. This stipulation was 
accepted and approved by the Administrative Law Judge (ALI) Debbie Hann on January 7, 
2009 and Case No. 08-0988 was dismissed. 
The Petitioner filed the present adjudication on March 22, 2010, which is assigned 
Case No. 10-0208, again regarding the industrial accident on May 16, 2007. The Petitioner 
claims medical expenses, recommended care, temporary total compensation, temporary 
partial compensation, permanent partial compensation, permanent total compensation, 
and unpaid interest. 
Respondents filed an Answer on April 26, 2010 indicating that they have paid the 
Petitioner temporary total compensation from June 30, 2008 to June 30, 2009 in the total 
amount of $13,123.92 and permanent partial compensation for a 12% whole perso_n 
impairment in the amount of $10,558.08, as well as approximately $14,338.18 in medical 
expenses. Respondents defend on the grounds that they have paid the Petitioner all claims 
for which they are liable, and that the Petitioner's continuing medical conditions are not 
medically causally related to the May 16, 2007 industrial accident. Respondents further 
argue that the Petitioner is not permanently totally disabled due to the industrial accident. 
A hearing was held on January 27, 2011 before Judge Hann. At the hearing the 
Petitioner withdrew her claim for temporary compensation because it had been paid 
through March 19, 2010. She indicated that her permanent total compensation claim 
begins on March 19, 2010, and clarified that her claim for medical expenses in.eludes a 
September 2010 backsurgery and ongoing treatment.. 
Judge Hann issued Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order on March 10, 
2011. Judge Hann concluded that the Petitioner was permanently totally disabled from the 
May 16, 2007 industrial accident and ordered Respondents to begin paying the Petitioner 
the subsistence benefits required by statute. Judge Hann also determined that the claimed 
medical treatment (September 2010 surgery) was necessitated by the industrial accident, 
and ordered the Respondents to pay those medical·expenses. 
The Respondents filed a Motion for Review on April 11, 2011. Respondents argued 
that the Petitioner's surgery was not necessitated by the industrial accident and that the 
Petitioner was not permanently and totally disabled because of the accident, arguing that 
she is capable of performing basic work activities and that there are suitable, available jobs 
that she can perform. Respondents also argued that the case should have been sent to a 
medical panel. The Petitioner filed an opposing memorandum. 
• 
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The Appeals Board issued an Order of Remand. Pursuant to that Order, Judge Hann 
held a second hearing on August 7, 2012 and took additional evidence, including a new 
medical exhibit which was filed on June 18, 2012 cons isting of six vo lumes and 1,549 pages. 
The case has now been reassigned to Judge Marlowe, who has reviewed the evidentiary 
record and completes this adjudication . 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
l&gal and Medical Causation 
Utah Code Annotated§ 34A-2-401 provides that an employee who is injured "by 
accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment" can receive 
benefits. In Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme 
Court adopted a two-part test causation analysis. The first component deals with "legal 
causation" while the second addresses "medical causation." 
With regard to medical causation, the Petitioner must show that any conditions for 
which he claims benefits are medically causally related to an industrial accident. "Under 
the medical cause test, the claimant must show ... that the stress, strain or exertion 
required by his or her occupation led to the resulting injury or disability." Allen v. 
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986). The burden of proof lies with the 
Petitioner. 
The parties have stipulated, and t he ALJ concludes, that the Petitioner was injured 
by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with the Respondent 
University of Utah Huntsman Cancer Hospital on May 16, 2007 which resulted in a 
permanent aggravation of her pre-existing thoracic condition resulting in a decompression 
and fusion surgery on July 1, 2008. 
Scope of Remand 
At the August 2, 2012 hearing, the parties disagreed as to the scope of the 
acceptable evidence to be considered on remand. The Petit ioner asserts that the medical 
cause of the Petitioner's need for the second surgery cannot be addressed on remand 
because that finding was not disturbed on review. The Respo ndents assert that the prior 
findings were set aside so new medical evidence can be considered, which includes Dr. 
Mattingly's opinion that the there is no medical causal connection between the Petitioner's 
industrial accident and the need for a second surgery. As a result, the Respondents assert 
this puts the Petitioner's functional restrictions resulting from her surgeries at issue, 
because medical causation is at issue. 
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The Remand Order includes findings of fact, stating, "The Appeals Board finds the 
following facts to be material to the Hospital's motion for review." The Order then outlines 
the following facts: 
Ms. Quast suffered from a pre-existing thoracic-spine condition which she 
permanently aggravated on May 16, 2007, when she slipped and fell while working 
for the Hospital. To treat her injury, Ms. Quast underwent decompression and 
fusion surgery on her thoracic spine on July 1, 2008. 
Following the surgery, Ms. Quast's mid-back pain persisted and was eventually 
diagnosed as nonunion of the fused vertebrae in her thoracic spine. In September 
2010, Ms. Quast was given work restrictions of no lifting more than 20 pounds or 
repetitive flexion or extension of her thoracic spine .... 
None of these facts were inconsistent with the factual findings made in the Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order was issued on March 10, 2011. Instead, the 
Commission ruled that there was insufficient evidence in the record after the second 
surgery to properly evaluate the case, stating "there is no further opinion or information in 
the record pertaining to Ms. Quast's current status, impairment or activity restrictions after 
the September 2010 surgery." The Order then states: 
Further information is required regarding Ms. Quast's current conditic;m in order to 
properly determine whether she is entitled to permanent total disability 
compensation. The Appeals ·Board therefore remands the matter to Judge Hann to 
hold additional proceedings as necessary to make additional findings pertaining to 
Ms. Quast's impairment, activity restrictions and any other information regarding her 
condition following the second surgery." (Emphasis added.) 
There is nothing in the Remand Order which requires reconsideration of the issue of 
the medical cause of the Petitioner's thoracic spine problems. At the time of the January 27, 
201.1 hearing, there was medical evidence in the record, specifically Dr. Newton'.s opinion, 
that the Petitioner had "no medically verifiable injury that we can easily relate to the 
industrial events ofS-16-07 . .. it is more likely than not that the TB-9 and T9-10 disc 
protrusions were incidental findings .... So in summary I can only assume that if the 
patient sustained any injury, it was a contusion of the left hip.'.' But, based upon the prior . 
stipulation, approved by the Commission on January 8, 2009, the parties agreed that the 
stipulation as to the medical cause of the Petitioner's thoracic spine problems was binding. 
This was based upon Dr. Moress' evaluation and opinion that the Petitioner suffered a 
permanent aggravation of her pre-existing thoracic spine problems. The Stipulation states 
in relevant part: 
The parties agree that the May 16, 2007, industrial accident permanently 
aggravated Petitioner's preexisting thoracic condition and that the thoracic 
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decompression and fusion surgery performed on July 1, 2008, was related to the 
Industrial accident .... 
As a result, medical causation was not addressed at the January 27, 2011 hearing even 
though Dr. Newton 's opinion was in conflict with those of Drs. Moress and Patel. The 
Remand Order does not disturb any of these findings nor does it direct that the medical 
causation dispute, which existed in the evidentiary record at the time of the hearing, now 
be addressed. 
Dr. Deborah Mattingly's opinion, rendered on April 12, 2012 after the Remand 
Order was issued, opined the Petitioner suffered a temporary aggravation of her pre-
existing back problems because of the industrial accident Dr. Mattingly disagreed with the 
medical opinions that the accident caused a permanent aggravation. Dr. Mattingly 
referenced and agreed with Dr. Newton's opinion on this point. Dr. Mattingly assigned 
permanent wo.rk restrictions of no lifting over 20 pounds, limited bending and alternate 
sitting, standing and walking as needed. This is consistent with the work restrictions 
assigned by Drs. Patel and Newton. However, Dr. Mattingly opined that none of these work 
restrictions were the result of the industrial accident because it did not medically cause the 
Petitioner's thoracic spine problems that resulted in surgical treatment. But, as outlined 
above, the m_edical cause of the Petitioner's thoracic spine problems was not reversed or 
re-opened in the Remand Order. 
The ALJ concludes that the medical cause of the Petiti9ner's thoracic spine probl~ms 
exceeds the scope of the Remand Order. Dr. Mattingly's opinion of permanent work 
restrictions is considered in the analysis below. However, the issue of medical causation of 
the thoracic spine will not be re-opened or sent to a medical panel. 
Permanent Total Disability 
The Petitioner's claim for permanent total disability compensation must be · 
evaluated under the standard established by U.C.A. 34A-2-413(1) of the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act. Specifically, Sec. 413(1)(b) requires that the Petitioner prove-three 
elements: 1) She has suffered significant impairment as a result of the work accident; 2) 
She is permanently and totally disabled, as defined by subsection 413(1)(c); and 3) Her . 
work accident is the direct cause of the permanent total disability. These requirements are 
discussed below. 
1. Significant Impairment 
A "significant impairment or combination of impairments" under Utah Cod~§ 
34A-2-413(1)(b)(i) must be as the result of the industrial accident. In DeMille v. Thurston 
Cable Construction. Case No. 00-1059 (5/30/03); 2003 UT Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 87, the 
Commission defined this as "a purely medical condition reflecting any anatomical or 
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function abnormality or loss." A significant impairment does not have to be demonstrated 
by an impairment rating. Crafts v. Labor Comm'n, 2005 Utah App. LEXIS 235 (Utah Ct. App. 
2005). 
The Petitioner's thoracic spine is fused from T7-T12. She is now limited to lifting 20 
pounds and must avoid any repetitive flexion or extension of her thoracic spine. The 
Petitioner's thoracic spine condition has been rated at 22% whole person, of which 12% is 
due to the May 16, 2007 industrial accident. The ALJ concludes the Petitioner has a 
significant impairment. 
2. Permanent Total Disability 
Subsection 413(1)(b)(ii) requiest that the Petitioner prove she is permanently 
totally disabled according to the four-part definition set out in subsection 413(1)(c)(i) 
through (iv). Each of the four components of 413(1)(c) are summarized and discussed 
below. ·. 
Gainful employment 
Subsection 413 (1) ( c) (i) requires a finding that "the employee is not gainfully 
employed." The Petitioner is not gainfully employed. The Petitioner returned to her job 
and attempted to work for about 1.5 months after her July 2008 surgery. The Petitioner 
was unable to physically perform her job duties as a housekeeper for the respondent. The 
Petitioner's last day worked was two months and 3 weeks prior to her September 7, 2010 
surgery which would have been June 17, 2010. 
Impairments that limit ability to perform basic work activities 
The Commission views the term "basic work activities" as referring to common 
activities shared in a wide variety of occupational settings, and notto the unique 
requirements or a particular job. In this sense, the term includes ability to report for work 
and remain there for a typical day, as well as the degree of flexibility, strength, 
comprehension, and ability to communicate that is required by the broad range of modern 
jobs. Thus, this factor should not be judged against either the most strenuous o·r the most 
sedentary work, but instead, what may be taken as relatively common requirements in the 
broad middle range of employment. Chad D. Parkinson v. Chatco, Inc., et al., Case No. 03-
0501, Commission Decision issued October 31, 2005. 
The ALJ concludes that the Petitioner has a limited ability to do basic work. The 
Petitioner suffers from a 22% whole person impairment of her thoracic spine which limits 
her ability to lift tnore than 20 pounds or to flex or extend her thoracic spine. The 
Petitioner also has a very limited intellectual functioning. ·The Petitioner was not able to 
complete high school even with the assistance of special education. The Petitioner has a 
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limited ability to read, write, understand math or to learn. The Petitioner also suffers from 
a developmental disability. The Petitioner received special education and dropped out of 
high school in the 12th grade.1 The Petitioner testified she suffers from dyslexia, which 
causes her to read things upside down or backwards. The Petitioner also suffered from 
chronic pain and depression prior to the industrial accident. The Petitioner was also born 
with underdeveloped kidneys and now has only one kidney. The Petitioner had bilateral 
upper extremity pain which has been surgically treated. She also suffers from migraines. 
The combination of the Petitioner's physical and intellectual limitations limits her ability to 
perform basic work activities. 
Inability to perform essential functions of past work 
Subsection 413(1)(c)(iii) requires that "the industrial ... impairments prevent the 
employee from performing the essential functions of the work activities for which the 
employee has been qualified until the time of the industrial accident .... " This requirement 
focuses only on work-related impairments and their effect on the Petitioner's ability to 
perform her prior work. 
The Petitioner has worked as a housekeeper in hospitals for about 20 years. The 
Petitioner was required to lift 50-70 pounds, clean bathrooms, wash walls, clean furniture, 
make and clean beds, sweep and mop floors and dust. Housekeeping in a hospital setting is 
medium level physical demand work. The Petitioner's work restriction of no lifting over 20 
pounds alone takes her out of this category of work. The Petitioner has no other work 
experience. · The AL) concludes that the Petitioner's thoracic back condition resulting 
from the May 16, 2007 industrial accident prevents her from performing the essential 
functions of the basic work activities for which she was qualified to perform at the time of 
industrial accident. 
Ability to do other work 
This final part of subsection 413(2)(c) requires the ALJ to consider whether the 
Petitioner can do other work that is reasonably available to her, taking into account her 
age, education, past work experience, medical capacity and residual functional.capacity . 
I Although not presented as an exhibit at the hearing, attached to the Petitioner's Application for Hearing is a 
copy of the February 17, 2010 Notice of Attorney Advisor Decision-Fully Favorable which granted.the 
Petitioner Social Security Disability benefits on the basis of her thoracic spine condition and borderline 
intellectual functioning. Although Respondents object to the consideration of this piece of evidence because it 
was not offered nor admitted at the hearing. it was nonetheless an attachment to a pleading and therefore 
already part of the evidentiary record. This decision notes that psychological testing conducted as part of the 
Social Security evaluation revealed below average intellectual functioning, including a full scale intelligence 
quotient score of only 70. This evidence must be addressed in any subsequent proceedings related to re-
employment. 
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The Petitioner is 39 years old and dropped out of high school in 12th grade. The 
Petitioner was in special education classes in high school and suffers from a learning 
disability. The Petitioner's work experience is as a hospital housekeeper. As a result of 
the May 16, 2007 accident, she is restricted to lifting no more than 20 pounds and must 
avoid any repetitive flexion and extension of her thoracic spine. The Petitioner also has 
limited intellectual abilities. The Petitioner's work history is unskilled labor. As a result, 
she does not possess any transferable work skills. 
Mike Hyatt, the respondents' vocational expert, believes the Petitioner can perform 
work as a hotel/motel housekeeper because it meets the light category of work which is the 
category of work that does not require lifting over 20 pounds. 
Working as a hotel/motel housekeeper would require the Petitioner to change 
linens, strip and make beds, vacuum, clean bathrooms, empty garbage cans and dust. 
Stripping a bed requires the blanket and cover to be pulled off and the sheets and pillow 
cases removed. Common sense indicates the following activities also require bending or 
exertion at the thoracic level: 1) Cleaning bathrooms, including mopping floors, cleaning 
sinks and counter at waist level; 2) Cleaning over sink mirrors, reaching upward and 
forward; 3) Cleaning tub/shower combinations (included in most hotel rooms) that 
requires reaching and bending with the upper body to clean; 4) Cleaning a toilet; 5) 
Vacuuming carpet with movement of arm and torso. 
A hotel/motel housekeeper is required to clean many rooms a day at a quick pace. It 
is clear that the majority of tasks a hotel/motel housekeeper performs require repetitive 
extension and flexion of the thoracic spine. The ALJ concludes that the job of hoteljmotel 
housekeeper would require the Petitioner to engage in repetitive flexion and extension of 
her thoracic spine and exceeds her medical restrictions resulting from the May 16, 2007 
industrial accident. 
Paul Barnes, the respondent's vocational expert, believes the Petitioner can perform 
a job at Avalon Health Care, an assisted living home for veterans, as a housekeeper. Mr. 
Barnes did not know the specific job tasks other than having past experience and being 
able to read, write and follow oral and written directions. Common sense indicates that an 
assisted living home would have bedrooms and bathrooms where the residents live that a 
housekeeper would clean, and that the housekeeping tasks would be the same or similar to 
that of a hotel/motel housekeeper. Based upon the above findings related to hotel/motel 
housekeeping, a housekeeper in an-assisted living home would require repetitive flexion 
and extension of the Petitioner's thoracic spine and exceed her work restricdons as the 
result of the May 16, 2007 industrial accident. 
Mr. Barne_s also opined that the Petidoner could engage in light assembly work 
assembling light medical plastics and that job openings exist Optima Consulting and Integra 
Life Sciences. Critically, Mr. Barnes and Mr. Hyatt were not aware of the specific job 
• 
• 
• 
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requirements for these jobs and was unable to provide any details as to the physical 
requirements of these jobs other than meeting the Petitioner's lifting weight limitation. In 
identifying light housekeeping and light assembly work as other work the Petitioner could 
perform, Mr. Hyatt agreed that bending and reaching is not a lways noted in the Dictionary 
of Occupational Titles, which formed the basis of his opinion. Common sense indicates that 
genera lly most assembly work requires rapid reaching and bending of the upper back to 
assemble parts, either seated or standing at a work station table or an assembly line. 
Neither Mr. Barnes nor Mr. Hyatt described the jobs they ident ified as not having this 
requirement. 
The ALJ concludes that the other work identified by the Respondents does not meet 
the Petitioner's work limitation of having to avoid any repetitive flexion and extension of 
her thoracic spine. The ALJ therefore concludes that the Petitioner cannot perform other 
work reasonably available, taking into consideration her age, education, past work 
experience, medical capacity and residual functional capacity. 
3. Work accident as "direct cause" of disability 
The Petitioner has very limited intellectual abilities and her work history is 
dominated·by one task: cleaning. Although the Petitioner suffered from many conditions, 
including depression, chronic pain, including neck and back pain, migraines, incontinence, 
upper extremity pain and other aiJm·ents, she continued to do her work as a hospital 
housekeeper, classified as medium level physical demand work, until the May 16, 2007 
industrial accident. The Petitioner also tried to return to her work as a housekeeper 
following treatment for her injuries as the result of this accident but was not successful due 
to her physical limitations following the thoracic fusion s urgery. The Petitioner did not 
have physical restrictions that prevented her from performing her job duties until the May 
16, 2007 industrial accident. The ALJ concludes the Petitioner's January 26, 2007 
industrial injury is direct cause of the Petitioner's permanent total disability 
Summary 
The Petitioner is tentatively permanently totally disabled as the result of the May 
16, 2007 industrial accident beginning June 18; 2010, when the Petitioner was no longer 
able to work because of her thoracic spine condition. 
Medical Expenses 
The Petitioner is entitled to payment of medical expenses related to her September 
7, 2010 thoracic surgery to repair the non-union from the prior surgery. There is no 
dispute that the Petitioner suffered a non-union. Both Dr. Patel and Dr. Newton agree on 
this point. Although Dr. Newton opined that it was not "an. urgency" he has not opined the 
surgery was not necessary to t reat this condition. 
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ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondents, University of Utah Huntsman 
Cancer Hospital and Workers Compensation Fund, pay the Petitioner subsistence benefits 
at the rate of $282.00 per week beginning June 18, 2010 and continuing until further order 
of the Commission. Those amounts accrued to date are due and payable in a lump sum p lus 
interest at the rate of 8% per annum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that statutory attorneys' fees shall be paid directly to 
Daniel F. Bertch, according to Utah Code§ 34A-1-309 and Utah Administrative Code, Rule 
602-2-4. That amount shall be deducted from Petitioner's award and sent directly to Mr. 
Bertch's office. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Respondents University of Utah Huntsman 
Cancer Hospital and Workers' Compensation Fund, pay the Petitioner for necessary 
medical treatment incurred to treat her thoracic spine condition as the result of the 
industrial accident, including, but not limited to, the September 7, 2010 surgery, pursuant 
to the Commission RB RVS fee schedule, plus interest at the rate of8% per annum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Respondents University of Utah Huntsman 
Cancer Hospital and Workers' Compensation Fund notify the Commission in writin_g within 
45 days ofthe date of this order whether a re-employment plan shall be submitted. )f the 
respondents elect to submit a re-employment plan within 45 days of the date of this order, 
the re-employment plan shall be submitted to the Commission within 90 days of the date of 
this order. 
? I W-
DATED this ___ day of January, 2014 
~ 
Deidre Marlowe 
Administrative Law Judge 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the 
Adjudication Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth 
the specific basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from 
the -date this decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the 
Motion for Review within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission 
conduct the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for 
• 
• 
• 
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Review or its response. If none of the parties specifically request r eview by the Appeals 
Board, the review will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commiss ioner. 
Rashell Quast vs. University of Utah Huntsman Cancer Hospital and/or Workers 
Compensation Fund C:1se No. 10-0208 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
1 hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER UPON REMAND was mailed on January 31, 2014, to 
the persons/parties at the following addresses: 
Rashell Quast 
c/o Daniel F Bertch Esq 
dan@bertchrobson.com 
Workers Compensation Fund 
designated_agent@wcfgroup.com 
University of Utah Huntsman Cancer Hospital 
c/o Hans Scheffler Esq 
hscheffl@wcfgroup.com 
Daniel F Bertch Esq 
dan@bertchrobson.com 
Hans Scheffler Esq 
hscheffl@wcfgroup.com 
UTAJi.L~OR COMMj§~ION~ 
~~~ .. 
Clerk 
Adjudication Division 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
RASHELL QUAST, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HUNTSMAN 
- C:ANGER-H0SP1-T-A:b-and-W0RlfERS -
COMPENSATION FUND, 
Respondents. 
ORDER ON MOTION 
FOR REVIEW 
--- Case-N o.--1-0-0208----------
University of Utah Huntsman Cancer Hospital and its insurance carrier, Workers 
Compensation Fund, ( collectively referred to as "Huntsman") ask the Utah Labor Commission to 
review Administrative Law Judge Marlowe's preliminary award of permanent total disability 
compensation to Rash ell Quast under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Title 34A, Chapter 2, 
Utah Code_ Annotated. 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to §63G-
4-301 of the Utah Ad.rniJpstrative Procedures Act and §34A-2-801(4) of the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED 
Ms. Quast sustained a thoracic-spine injury on May 16, 2007, while she was working for 
Huntsman. Ms. Quast originally filed a claim for benefits in 2008, case number 08-0988, but the · 
parties resolved that claim by way of a stipulation. Specifically, the parties stipulated that Ms. Quast 
had a pre-existing thoracic-spine injury that was permanently aggravated by the work accident and 
that Huntsrpan was responsible for the cost of surgery in July 2008 to treat the injury. 
Ms. Quast then filed another claim for permanent total disability compensation and medical 
benefits related to the 2007 work accident, which is the subject of the ctment dispute. .She 
- · ·underwent aad1t1onal surgery m Sepfember 2010-to acldress a nonumon ftbrrrth-e--2008··surgery;·but- .. . · ... -
her. work restrictions and impairment rating were not clearly addressed. Judge Hann held an 
evidentiary hearing and awarded benefits :to Ms. Quast including an award of permanent total 
disability compensation. Huntsman appealed the award to the Appeals Board, which found that 
further medical_ evidence was necessary to determine Ms. Quast's entitlement to benefits and 
remanded the matter. 
. . 
On remand, Judge Hann held another evidentiary hearing and took additional medical 
evidence on Ms. Quast's condition. The matter was then reassigned to Judge Marlowe, who 
reviewed the evidence and concluded that Ms. Quast was entitled to the cost of the 2010 surgery and 
--~----·--·----··-· - ------- ------------ ·-----------------
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a preliminary award of permanent total disability compensation subject to Huntsman's right to 
submit a reemployment plan. Huntsman now seeks review of Judge Marlowe's decision by arguing 
that there are conflicting medical opinions with regard to the necessity of the 2010 surgery and Ms. 
Quast's work restrictions such that referral to an impartial medical panel is necessary. Huntsman 
also submits that Ms. Quast has not established entitlement to perrpanent total disability 
comgensation. 
·-·· -··-•------ -···- · - ·· · ····- ··- -•· ·· ··-· ··· ··-··· ···-•·•- --------------- -
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission finds the following facts to be material to Huntsman's motion for review. 
Ms. Quast was born in 1971. She has a learning disability and dropped out of high school iii the 12th 
grade. Ms. Quast's employment background consists of working as a hospital housekeeper, where 
she was required occasional heavy lifting, cleaning bathrooms, taking out the trash, washing walls 
· and floors, making beds, cleaning furniture, and dusting. She has a history of urological problems in 
addition to migraines and chronic back pain. Ms. Quast has suffered vario"9s work injuries over the 
years and has been assessed with different work restrictions as a result; however, there fs no 
indication that she had permanent restrictions as a result of such injuries. 
. On May 16, 2007, Ms. Quast was working for Huntsman when she slipped on a wet floor and 
fell to the ground. She underwent decompression and fusion surgery on her thoracic spine performed 
by Dr. Patel in July 2008. As noted above, the parties entered into a stipulation that Ms. Quast 
sustained an "injury by accident while in the course and scope of her employment with [Huntsman]." 
The parties further agreed that the accident "permanently aggravated [Ms. Quast's] pre-existing 
thoracic condition" and that the 2008 surgery was necessary due to the accident. After she was 
released to return to work, Ms. Quast worked for about a month before resigning. 
Ms. Quast's mid-back pain persisted after the surgery. Dr: Poppen opined in August 2009 
that Ms. Quast was "100% disabled" from all of lq.er conditions. In December 2009, Dr. Poppen 
assessed Ms. Qtiast<V,1ith a: thor_acic disc-herniation andmyelopathy thatrequir~d surg~i:y: ' Dr._ Popp.e.n,~.-."""::. .. : ... , ... 
also found that increased pain medication- beyond what Ms. Quast was pr~scribed before the 
accident- was necessary due to the 2007 work injury. In early 2010, Dr.':Wold evaluated Ms. Quast 
and.re.commended physic.al th!;!rapy ap._d_gill_Lt.r.aj_n_ipg f..o_r_J:i~r tb,Qrn~jc-:spiP,e cqndition. · 
···-· .. ·- .. ··-·· · ---- ·· - . 
Ms. Quast followed up with Dr. Patel, who ordered a CT scan to diagnose her continued 1:fack 
pain. Dr. Patel diagnosed Ms. Quast with a nonunion in her thoracic spine at the Tl 1 level and 
unstable hardware installed during the 2008 surgery. Ms. Quast underwent a functional capacity 
. evaluation in August 2010, where she demonstrated the ability to lift twenty pounds and to work in 
the light physical demand category of jobs. She showed limited range of motion in her thoracic 
spine, but full functional range of motion throughout her entire spine and she tolerated repetitive 
forward reaching as well. 
p 
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In early September 2010, Huntsman's medical consultant, Dr. Newton, acknowledged tl1e 
possibility of redoing the fusion at Tl 0-11, but opined that such treatment was not urgent. Dr. 
Newton added that Ms. Quast's limitations were largely self-imposed, but that she should not lift 
more than 20 pounds and should avoid repetitive flexion or extension of her spine due to the 2007 
work injury. Dr. Newton also found that neither medication nor assistive devices were necessary to 
treat Ms. Quast' s work injury. Dr .. Patel performed_ a surgi~al revision later in Se2tember 2010 and 
confumed the nonunion and failed hardware diagnosis postoperatively. 
Following the 2010 surgery, Dr. Lawrence, who took over for Dr. Patel, opined that Ms. 
Quast showed significant improvement since the last surgery and was doing well overall despite her 
complaints of continued back pain. Ms. Quast underwent another functional capacity evaluation in 
2012 administered by Ms. Marchant, who concluded that Ms. Quast could lift 20 pounds 
occasionally and 10 pounds frequently and still demonstrated the capacity for light work. Ms. 
Marchant also found that Ms. Quast again demonstrated limited motion of her spine, but was then 
observed exceeding measured motion during the functional tasks. Ms. Marchant noted that Ms. 
Quast did not give a consistently credible effort during the evaluation and exhibited signs of 
symptom magnification. 
Another of Huntsman's medical consultants, Dr. Mattingly, evaluated Ms. Quast in April 
2012. Dr. Mattingly opined that neither the 2008 surgery nor the 2010 revision were medically 
caused by the 2007 work accident because Ms. Quast sustained only a temporary aggravation of her 
pre-existing back condition from the accident. Dr. Mattingly assessed Ms. Quast with chronic back 
pain, generalized anxiety, depression and opiate dependency. Dr. Mattingly recognized that Ms. 
Quast' s ability to work was constrained by her heavy use of pain medication, but concluded Ms. 
Quast did not have any work restrictions due to the 2007 accident. Dr. Mattingly added that 
reasonable work restrictions based on Ms. Quast' s pre-existing conditions would be no lifting more 
than 20 pounds, limit bending, and alternate between sitting, standing and walking as needed. 
Ms.-Quast 'te'sti:fied 'that she has-not attempted to find wqrk since the 2008 surgery. Buntsman . ..a. • .._: •• _.;.,-
presented the testimony of two different vocational rehabilitation experts, Mr. Hiatt and Mr. Barnes, 
who testified that Ms. Quast could return to work as a housekeeper at a hotel or an assisted living 
... - .. facility based.on.her..lifting restriction._Neither Mr._B.arnes. nor.Mr. Hiatt could state. whether.s~ch. . . .. _ . . . . ... 
positions required repetitive bending or reaching. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Huntsman raises two main issues in its motion for review: 1) whether it is necessary to refer 
certain aspects of Ms. Quast's claim to an impartial medical panel; and 2) whether Ms. Quast has 
established entitlement to permanent total disability compensation. The Commission addresses these 
issues as follows. 
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I. Medical Panel Referral 
Huntsman contends that there are differing medical opinions with regard to the medical cause 
of the 2010 surgery, future medical treatment due to the 2007 work accident, and Ms. Quast's work 
restrictions such that referral to a medical panel is required. The Commission's rule R602-2-2(A) 
______ :grovides that "[a] panel 'Y_iJ.IJ?..~_!!m!~-~~!..!:Y!here one or more significant medical issues may be 
involved. Generally, a significant medical issue must be shown by conflicting medical reports. 
Significant medical issues are involved when there are: 
1) conflicting medical opinions related to causation of the injury; 
2) conflicting medical opinions of permanent physical impairment which vary more 
than 5% of the whole person; 
3) conflicting medical opini0ns as to the temporary total cutoff date which vary 
more than 90 days; 
4) conflicting medical opinions related to a claim of permanent total disability; or 
5) medical expenses in controversy amounting to more than $10,000." 
Necessity of the 2010 Surgery 
The parties stipulated that the 2007 . accident permanently aggravated Ms. Quast' s pre-
existing thoracic-spine condition and that the 2008 .surgery was due to the work-related injury. The 
medical evidence shows that the 2010 surgery was to revise the 2008 procedure, the necessity for 
which was confirmed postoperatively by Dr. Patel. Dr. Newton noted the possibility of a surgical 
revision and, though he did not believe it to be urgent, did not clearly dispute the necessity of the 
2010 surgical revision. Dr. Poppen also described that Ms. Quast required thoracic-spine surgery 
even after the first procedure had been done. 
Dr. Mattingly opined after the fact that neither the 2008 nor the 2010 surgeries were 
-- - - ~ ~_-.., - -- necessary-to:·treat-Ms:-Quast1-s-w0rk-injury-:-Ho:we:v.er,t>r-.- MattiI;lgly-~s-opirrion-was-based: on-fue ·=--, .... :::=-;;-.=-. -
conclusion that the accident resulted in only a temporary .bac:;k injury rather than the permanent 
aggravation to which the parties had already stipulated. Based on the medical evidence provided, the 
. . ... _ . .. .. _ . Commission concludes_that th~_20l 0. sµ:rg~ry_w~_q_aus;:t]Jy _cpnp.~gt~q to :t.he 2008'.procedure: .Wb.f:n 
considering that the parties had already stipulated that the 2008 surgery was related to the work 
accident, Dr. Mattingly's reasoning on the issue is inapposite and there is no remaining conflict of 
medical opinions that would warrant referral to a medical panel. 
Necessity of Future Medical Care 
There are differing medical opinions regarding future medical care necessary to treat Ms. 
Quast's work-related thoracic-spine injury; however, such conflicting opinions do not require the 
utilization of a medical panel under the rule. Additionally, there is no indication that the medication, 
assistive device, or physical therapy expenses which constitute the different recommended treatments 
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amount to more than $10,000 such that a medical panel must be utilized according to rule. 
Dr. Newton found that no further medical care was necessary due to the accident, while Dr. 
Poppen and Dr. Wold had varying recommendations for future ·care. After reviewing the various 
medical opinions on the issue, the Commission is persuaded by Dr. Newton's opinion as it presented 
J __ -1!.Jnore thorough evaluation ofMs. __ Quast's condition and explanation as to why no medications or 
assistive devices were necessary on an industrial basis. Based on the evidence provided, the 
Commission finds that no future medical care is necessary to treat Ms. Quast's thoracic-spine injury. 
--·- - - ·-··---- I 
Work Restrictions 
The last issue that Huntsman argues may require consideration by a medical panel pertains to 
Ms. Quast's work restrictions. The Appeals Board previously remanded this m_atter for a better 
determination of Ms. Quast' s work restrictions following the 2010 surgery. The only evidence that 
clearly addresses Ms. Quast's post-surgery restrictions comes from Dr. Mattingly's evaluation in 
April 2012.1 Although Dr. Mattingly opined that Ms. Quast has no restrictions from the work 
accident, that opinion appears to stem from Dr. Mattingly's conclusion that the work accident 
resulted in only a temporary injury. Because it has been established that Ms. Quast sustained a 
permanent thoracic-spine injury from the 2007 accident, Dr. Mattingly's opinion regarding work 
restrictions, like her opinion on the necessity of the 2010 surgery, is not convincing. 
Ms. Quast chose not to supplement the record with evidence related to her work restrictions 
after the Appeals Board found additional evidence to be necessary. The combination ofMs. Quast's 
functional capacity evaluation results and Dr. Lawrence's opinion regarding her improvement after 
the 2010 surgery shows that Ms. Quast is even less limited than Dr. Newton found. Dr. Newton 
appeared to restrict repetitive flexion or extension of the spine based on the type of surgery that Ms. 
Quast' s underwent; however, she was observed to have full functional range of motion in her spine 
and to be able to reach without significant difficulty. The Commission finds that the work accident 
.- .. · - - · · ~ ·resw ted-inTestrieti ans of no·lifting-more. than .Z-0 .pi:nmcls· and-no ·i:epetiti:ve-bending of the. spine,-. ouh 9-~:;:;.;-:.::-.:.' - . 
that repetitive reaching is permissible. The Commission concludes that referral to a medical panel is 
not required to determine Ms. Quast's work restrictions or the other medical aspects of her claim. 
·--··--· -··--- · · -·- ·· -- --·-·-·-·• -·-··--- · ··- ···· ·· ····-- - · - ··- •·- --·- ·-···-··-···· · -·-- • -· · - · · · · · ---- -- - ···--- -········ . ··· ··- -- - . . . ·· · - ·--· 
II. Permanent Total Disability Compensation 
Section 34A-2-413 (1 )(b) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides that, in order to 
establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, an injured employee must show: 
(i) The employee sustained a significant impairment or combination ofimpairments as 
1 Dr. Knippa also performed a psychological evaluation of Ms. Quast following the 2010 surgery, but 
such evaluation did not address Ms. Quast' s work re~trictions except to find that her psychological 
condition and drug use limited her to performing unskilled labor. 
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a result of the industrial accident. .. that gives rise to the permanent total disability 
entitlement; 
(ii) The employee is permanently and totally disabled; and 
(iii) The industrial accident ... is the direct cause of the employee's permanent total 
disability. 
.. . .... ... --·- ·-··-- --- --- ------- ------
Significant Impairment 
Huntsman argues that Ms. Quast did not sustain a significant impairment from the 2007 
accident essentially because she retains much of the same functional ability she · had before ·the 
accident. The evidence shows that the work accident resulted in a thoracic-spine impairment that 
limits Ms. Quast from lifting more than 20 pounds and from repetitive bending of the spine. Nearly 
all of Ms. Quast's past work involved housekeeping tasks in a hospital setting, at least some of 
which she can no longer perform because of her impaired lifting ability. The medical evidence 
shows that Ms. Quast does retain most of her functional · ability from before the accident; but her 
work-related spine impairment impacts her ability to do at least some of the work she has done for 
her entire career. The Commission therefore concludes that Ms. Quast's work-related spine 
impairment is significant. Ms. Quast has met §413(l)(b)(i). 
Permanent Total Disability 
Subsection 34A-2-413(1)(b)(ii) requires Ms. Quast to demonstrate that she is permanently 
and totally disabled according to the requirements of§34A-2-413(1)( c ). It is Ms. Quast' s burden to 
prove each of the following: 
(i) The employee is not gainfully employed; 
· (ii) The employee has· ail impairment or combination of impairments .that limit the· 
employee's ability to do basic work activities; 
• 
---- j 
r 
' I 
-~ .-· - -- -·-: - -;-.- . 
· . ·· (iii)- -The-industrial impairment or occupationally caused impairment-or combination of --7 .. ·••• •• -~-~ • • •. • .:::._--:·..:: - · · ·r 
impairments prevent the employee from performing the essential functions of the 
work activities for which the employee has been qualified until the time of the 
. . .... .. .industrial accident . .. thaUs.the .basis for the. employee.' s permanent total disabjlitr. . _ .. _ _. . ... 
cl~m;and i 
(iv) The employee cannot perform· other work reasonably" available, taking into 
consideration the employee's age, education, past work experience, medical 
capacity, and residual functional capacity. . 
Ms. Quast is not gainfully employed. With respect to the next element, §413(1)(c)(ii), the 
Commissi_on has consistently interpreted the term "basic work activities" as common factors 
generally_ required in a wide variety of employment settings. These factors include the_ ability to 
report for work on a regular basis and remain at work through the day, as well as a reasonable degree 
of flexibility, strength, endurance, mental capacity and ability to communicate. The impairment in 
r---- ---- ------ - --- ---- - -------------------- ----- ------- -
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question need not be related to the work accident. Ms. Quast suffers from various conditions that 
affect her ability to function, including a learning disorder, urological problems, migraines, and 
thoracic-spine problems. However, she was able to work for many years with her pre-existing 
conditions, which leads the Commission to conclude that such conditions do not reasonably limit her 
ability to do basic work activities. With respect to Ms. Quast's thoracic-spine condition, the results 
_____ _ _ of the functional_ capacity evaluation are particularly helpful. During the first evaluations, Ms. Quast 
tolerated repetitive reaching and demonstrated full functional range of motion in her entire spine. 
Since that evaluation, Dr. Lawrence, noted "significant improvement'' in Ms. Quast' s condition after 
the revision-surgery. Ms. Quast's ability to lift 20 pounds and her difficulty only with repetitive 
bending of her spine show that she still has a reasonable· degree of strength and flexibility. · The 
record also shows Ms. Quast can work in the light physical demand category of jobs, and there is no 
indication of any limitation in her ability to communicate, report for work, or remain at work through 
the day. Based on the evidence presented, the Commission finds Ms. Quast has not shown that her 
impairments limit her ability to do basic work activities. 
Although Ms. Quast has not met §413(1 )( c )(ii), the Commission will consider the remaining 
elements of §413(1) in the interest of completeness. The next element requires Ms. Quast to show 
that her work-related thoracic-spine problems prevent her from performing the essential functi,ons of 
the work activities· for which she has been qualified until the 2007 work accident. As aiready 
discussed, Ms. Quast' s work injury limits her ability to lift heavy objects and her duties as a hospital 
housekeepenequired herto do some heavy lifting. There is no indication in the rec_ord as to how 
often Ms. Quast's work as a hospital housekeeper required b·ending of her spine, but her impaired 
lifting ability precludes her from returning to the work for which she was qualified until the time of 
the accident. Ms. Quast meets §413(1)(c)(iii). 
The final element of §413(l)(c) requires Ms. Quast to show that she cannot perform other 
work reasonably available considering her age, education, past work experience, medical capacity, 
and residual functional capacity. Ms. Quast returned to work for about a month after the 2008 
-. •.··- .,.,_ -_,..._ - , - surgery ;·but has-not attempted.to find another job since then, -The Commi~siop ;n_o_te~, bo\\lever., th?.,t ·-. _ -.-.- _ :· ... 
her treating physician, Dr. Poppen, found her to be "l 00% disabled," which explains why she would. ·· ·· · · 
not look for work. Ms. Quast is relatively young and has years of experience in housekeeping tasks, 
... _ _____ ·- · but..also _  hasJimited .. int~U~.c~. ~<:!p~cj:ty _cµiq _~d~a#9.!L _ _ __ ______ ·-·· __ .. . . .. __ ___ .. . ___ . ..... . ___ ... _____ _ ... ___ _ 
The main reason why Ms. Quast claims to be unable to work is her thoracic-spine condition; 
however, such condition leaves her with good functional capacity as she can still lift up to 20 pounds 
and need only avoid repetitive bending of the spine. Huntsman's vocational rehabilitation experts 
testified that Ms. Quast could perform the duties of a housekeeper at a hotel or an assisted living 
facility. However, the experts' opinion was based primarily on Ms. Quast' s ability to lift 20 pounds 
and did not sufficiently address her restriction against repetitive bending of the spine. Certainly 
different housekeeping jobs entail different amounts of required bending and it may be that there 
exists a housekeeping job that Ms. Quast can perform with her restrictions. However, the failure by 
Huntsman's vocational experts to offer any information regarding such bending requirements leads 
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the Commission to find that Huntsman did not meet its burden of showing that there is other work 
reasonably available to Ms. Quast. 
Direct Cause 
_ ___________ As _Ms . . Q!!_~sL has not established that she is permanently and totally disabled, the 
Commission cannot conclude that the 2007 work accident .was the direct cause of such disability. 
While the record supports Ms. Quast' s assertion that she cannot return to work for Huntsman in the • 
same capacity as when the accident occurred, the ability to return to a previous position is not the 
only criterion for establishing that thework accident directly caused an injured worker's disability. 
Rather, Ms. Quast must show that she is permanently and totally unable to work because of the 
accident directly. Ms. Quast injured her back and underwent surgery oD"her spine due to the work 
accident, but she has not demonstrated that she is permanently and totally unable to work simply 
because she cannot return to her previous job. The medical evidence.shows Ms. Quast retains a level 
of functionality even after the surgery that allows her to work. 
Should Ms. Quast' s work-related spine condition deteriorate.such that a significant change in 
circumstances occurs, she may b e eligible for pemianent total disability compensation at some future 
date. As the evidence stands now, however, Ms1 Quast has not shown that she is entitled to 
permanent total disability compensation. The Commission therefore . disagrees with Judge 
Marlowe'~ decision regarding permanent total disability and denies Ms. Quast's claim for such 
compensation. 
ORDER 
The Commission sets aside the portion of Judge Marlowe's decision of January 31, 2014, 
awarding-subsistence-benefits to Ms. Quast for her claim ·of permanent total disability compensation 
and denies her claim for such benefits. The Commission affllTils the remaining portions of Judge 
Marlc?we' s .decision. 
Dated this.£. day of May, 2014. 
- ·-- -··---·-·• ____ .. -- ~ ----- ·-r ·/ ·-· -···-··---·--··-·· -··-·  .. .. ·---···-·--·-··----~--..•. i Jii" -~-- ... -·--· . ----.. -··------ ..... -. ···· -· .... --··-
·-s-h-err_1_· e-j{a--.... ayc...as-4--hi __ ------
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days dfthe date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
__ ___ .. _reyi_e_w_ with Jb_e 9.Q.lJrt,_ Any such petition for review must be received~ the ~9urt within 3 0 days of 
the date of this order . 
.. ·- -- ---·-··--·- --·- . ---- ··-·--·-•·•- ·- - --·- ·-· 
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I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order on Motion for Review in the matter of Rashell 
Quast, Case No. 10-0208, was mailed first class postage prepaid thisJi:'day of May, 2014, to the 
following: I 
Rashell Quast 
------ - -------------------------- ---- 1 
3831 S Hummingbird 
Salt Lake City UT 84123 
University of Utah Huntsman Cancer Hospital 
2000 Circle of Hope 
Salt Lake City UT 84112 
Workers Compensation Fund 
Dennis V. Lloyd Designated Agent 
100 W Towne Ridge Pkwy 
Sandy UT 84070 
Daniel F. Bertch, Esq. 
1996 E 6400 S Ste 100 
Salt Lake City UT 84121 
Hans Scheffler, Esq. 
Workers Compensation Fund Legal Dept 
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Sandy UT 84070 
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ADDENDUM "E" 
20 C.F.R. 404.1520. 

§ 404.1521. What we mean by an impairment(s) that is not severe. 
Code Of Federal Regulations 
Title 20. Employees' Benefits 
Chapter Ill. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 
Part 404. FEDERAL OLD-AGE, SURVIVORS AND DISABILITY INSURANCE (1950-) 
Subpart P. DETERMINING DISABILITY AND BLINDNESS 
EVALUATION OF DISABILITY 
Current through August 31, 2013 
§ 404.1521 . What we mean by an impairment(s) that is not severe 
(a) Non-severe impairment(s). An impairment or combination of impairments is not severe if it 
does not significantly limit your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 
(b) Basic work activities. When we talk about basic work activities, we mean the abilities and 
aptitudes necessary to do most jobs. Examples of these include-
(1) Physical functions such as walking, standing , sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, 
reaching, carrying, or handling; 
(2) Capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking; 
(3) Understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; 
(4) Use of judgment; 
(5) Responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations; 
and 
(6) Dealing with changes in a routine work setting. 
Cite as 20 CFR 404.1521 
History. 50 FR 8728, Mar. 5, 1985 
ADDENDUM "D" 
SSR85-28. 

6/512014 
Social Security 
Official Social Security Website 
Disability Insurance 
(PPS-122) 
SSR 85-28 
SSR 85-28 
SSR 85-28: TITLES II AND XVI: MEDICAL 
IMPAIRMENTS THAT ARE NOT SEVERE 
PURPOSE: To clarify the policy for determining when a person's impairment(s) may be found "not severe" 
and, thus, the basis for a finding of "not disabled" in the sequential 'evaluation of disability, and thereby 
reflect certain circuit court decisions that have taken ·issue with the Secretary's previously stated definition 
of "not severe" impairments. 
CITATIONS (AUTHORITY): Sections 216(i), 223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act, as 
amended; Regulations No. 4, sections 404:1520-404.1523 and Regulations No. 16, sections 416.920-
416.923. 
PERTINENT HISTORY: Th_e basic definiti,on of disability is contained in sections 223(d)(1)(A) and 1514(a) 
(3)(A) of the Act. Under this definition, an individual must have, as an initial requirement, a "physical or 
mental impairment," as defined in sections 223.(d)(3)" and 1614(a)(3)(C), and which is expected either to 
result in death or to last at least 12 months. The principal requirement regarding impairment severity 
contained in the·basic statutory definition of disability is that the individual's inability to engage in any 
substantial gainful activity (SGA) be "by reason of' the impairment. 
In reporting on the .Social ?ecurity Amendments of 1954 which first introduced the basic definition of 
disability into the Act, the Senate Committee on Finance indicated that the definition required that there 
be a "medically determinable impairment of serious proportions," that is, "of a nature and degree of 
severity sufficient to justify its consideration as the cause of failure to obtain any substantial gainful work." 
In the Social Security Amendments of 1967, Congress introd~ced. into the Act the provision in sectio,n 
223(d)(2)(A) which sets out a specific requirement respecting impairment sev~rity and which provides for 
the consideration of vocational factors in determining disability: An individual " ... shall be determined to 
be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he 
is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work 
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experience, engage in any kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy ... " 
(emphasis added). In reporting on these amendments, both the Senate Committee on Finance and the 
House Committee on Ways and Means reaffirmed the need for some assurance that a finding of disability 
would be based on a serious impairment. The Committees explained that the provisions of the 
amendment would require, in part, that: 
" ... an individual would be disabled only if it is shown that he has a severe medically determinable 
physical or mental impairment or impairments . .. " (emphasis added). 
As in '1954 and 1967,. Congress, again, in the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, 
made it clear that a denial of disability benefits may be based on medical factors alone. In amending 
section 223(d)(2) and section 1614(a)(3) of the Act to provide for the evaluation of the impact of multiple 
impairments throughout the sequential evaluation process, Congress introduced language which affirms 
the presence of a severity threshold in the adjudicative process: 
"In determining whether an individual's physical or mental impairment or impairments are of a 
sufficient medical severity that such impairment or impairments could be the basis of eligibility under 
this section, the Secretary shall consider the combined effect of all of the individual's impairments .. · 
The validity of a disability de_cision based on medical considerations alone was also recognized in the 
Conferees' discussion of the amendment (House of Representatives Conference Report 98-1039 to 
accompany H.R. 3755. September 19, 1984, p. 30) in which it was stated that there was no intention to 
"either eliminate or impair" the use of the "current sequential evaiuation process." 
The principal that a denial determination may be made on the basis of medical considerations alone was 
first reflected in Regulations No. 4, section 404.1502(a), published in 1960. Regulations published in . 
1978 revised the 1960 st~tement concerning such determinations by replacing the phrase " ... the only 
impairment is a slight neurosis, slight impairment of sight or hearing, or other slight abnormali_ty or 
combination of slight abnormalities .. . " with " ... the medically determinable impairment is not severe if it 
does not significantly limit an individual's physical or mental capacity to perform basic work-related 
functions." 
This change in regulatory definition was introduced in the language describing step 2 of the sequential 
evaluation process which was formalized in regulations effective February 26, 1979. (The 1980 
recodification of the Disability Regulations into common sense language reworded the definition of a riot 
severe impairment as follows: "An impairment is not severe if it does not significantly limit your physical or 
mental abilities to do basic work activities." 20 C.F.R. 404.1521(a) and 416.921(a). Also see sections 
404.1520(c) and 416.920(c).) These changes in regulatory language were not intended to alter the levels 
of severity for a finding of not disabled on the basis of medical considerations alone. Rather, they were 
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intended only to clarify the circumstances under which such a finding would be justified (Federal Register 
-- March 7, 1978, p. 9296-9297; November 28, 1978, p. 55357-55358). Nevertheless, some recent circuit 
court decisions have taken exception to the threshold of impairment severity applied in the adjudication of 
subject cases which were denied on the basis of not severe impairment. 
As observed by the Congress, the Social Security Administration (SSA), as part of an ongoing review, is 
reevaluating the application of the not severe impairment policy and will continue to do so. This ruling is 
part of the ongoing reevaluation and interprets and clarifies the current policy on not severe impairment, 
describes the threshold intended, and reflects recent legislation. Also, it is being issued to clarify that 
SSA's policy is consistent with various court decisions. For example, Stone v. Heckler, 752 F.2d 1099 (5th 
Cir. 1985), and Estran v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 340 (5th Circ. 1984), stated that "an impairment can be 
considered as not severe only if it is a slight abnormality which has such a minimal effect on the individual 
that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual's ability to work irrespective of age, education, 
or work experience." As Baeder v. Heckler, No. 84-5663 (3rd Cir. July 24, 1985), suggested, the severity 
regulation is to do no "more than allow the Secretary to deny benefits summarily to those applicants with 
impairments of a minimal nature which could never prevent a person from working." 
POLICY CLARIFICATION: In determining, for initial entitlement to benefits, whether an individual is 
disabled, we follow a sequential evaluation process whereby current work activity, severity and duration of 
impairment, ability to do past work, and ability to do other work (in light of the individual's age, education 
and work experience) are considered, in that order. See 20 CFR sections 404.1520 and 416.920. In 
determining co'ntimiing entitlement to benefits, the adjudicator, with appropriate consideration of the 
medical improvement review standard, also follows a sequential evaluation process which includes the 
"not severe impairment" concept. Fundamental to these processes is the statutory requirement that to be 
found disabled, an individual must have a medically determinable impairment "of such severity" that it 
precludes his or her engaging in any substantial gainful work. 
As explained in 20 CFR, sections 404.1520, 404.1521, 416.920(c), and 416.921 , at the second step of 
sequential evaluation it must be determined whether medical evidence establishes an impairment or 
combination of impairments "of such severity" as to be the basis of a finding of inability to engage in any 
SGA. An impairment or combination of impairments is found "not severe" and a finding of "not disabled" is 
made at this step when medical evidence establishes only a slight abnormality or a combination of slight 
abnormalities which would have no more than a minimal effect on an individual's ability to work even if the 
individual's age, education, or work experience were specifically considered (i.e. , the person's 
impair-ment(s) has no more than a minimal effect on his or her physical or mental ability(ies) to perform 
basic work activities). Thus, even if an individual were of advanced age, had minimal education, and a 
limited work experience, an impairment found to be not severe would not prevent him or her from 
engaging in SGA. 
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The severity requirement cannot be satisfied when medical evidence shows that the person has the ability 
to perform basic work activities, as required in most jobs. Examples of these are walking, standing, sitting, 
lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying or handling; seeing, hearing, and speaking; understanding, 
carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; use of judgment, responding appropriately to 
supervision, coworkers, and usual work situations; and dealing with changes in a routine work setting. 
Thus, these basic work factors are inherent in making a determination that an individual does not have a 
severe medical impairment. 
Although an impairment is not severe if it has no more than a minimal effect on an individual's physical or 
mental ability(ies) to do basic work activities, the possibility of several such impairments combining to 
produce a severe impairment must be considered. Under 20 CFR, sections 404.1523 and 416.923, when 
assessing the severity of whatever impairments an individual may have, the adjudicator must assess the 
impact of the combination of those impairments on the person's ability to function, rather than assess 
separately the contribution of each impairment existed alone. A claim may be denied at step two only if 
the evidence sho\NS that the individual's impairments, when considered in combination, are not medically 
severe, i.e., do not have more than a minimal effect on the person's physical or mental ability(ies) to 
perform basic work activities. If such a finding is not clearly established by medical evidence, however, 
;. r. 
adjudication must continue through the sequential evaluation process. 
Inherent in a finding of a medically not severe impairment or combination of impairments is the conclusion 
that the individual's ability to engage in SGA is not serious affected. Before this conclusion can be 
reached, however, an evaluation of the effects of the impairment(s) on the person's ability to do basic 
work activities must be made. A determination that an impairment(s) is not severe requires a careful 
• 
evaluation of the medical findings which describe the impairment(s) and an informed judgment about its 8 
(their) limiting effects on the individual's physical and mental ability(ies) to perform basic work activities; 
thus, an assessment of function is inherent in the medial evaluation process itself. At the second step of 
sequential evaluation, then, medical evidence alone is evaluated in order to assess the effects of the 
impairment(s) on ability to do basic work activities. If this assessment shows the individual to have the 
physical and mental ability(ies) necessary to perform such activities, no evaluation of past work (or of 
age, education, work experience) is needed. Rather, it is reasonable to conclude, based on the minimal 
impact of the impairment(s), that the individual is capable of engaging in SGA. 
By definition, basic work activities are the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs. In the 
absence of contrary evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that an individual whose impairments do not 
preclude the performance of basic work activities is, therefore, able to perform his, or her past relevant 
work. If the medical evidence establishes only a slight abnormality(ies) which has no more than a minimal 
effect on a claimant's ability to do basic work activities, but evidence shows that the person cannot 
perform his or her past relevant work because of the unique features of that work, a denial at the "not 
severe" step of the sequential evaluation process is inappropriate. The inability to perform past relevant 
http://www.socialsecurity.g o\A'OP _Horre/ruling s/di/01/SSR85-28--di-01.htrrl 4/5 
6/512014 SSR 85-28 
work in such instances warrants further evaluation of the individual's ability to do other work considering 
age, education and work experience.[11 
Great care should be exercised in applying the not severe impairment concept. If an adjudicator is unable 
to determine clearly the effect of an impairment or combination of impairments on the individual's ability to 
do basic work activities, the sequential evaluation process should not end with the not severe evaluation 
step. Rather, it should be continued. In such a circumstance, if the impairment does not meet or equal the 
severity level of the relevant medical listing , sequential evaluation requires that the adjudicator evaluate 
the individual's ability to do past work, or to do other work based on the consideration of age, education, 
and prior work experience. 
EFFECTIVE DATE: On publication. 
CROSS-REFERENCES: Program Operations Manual System, sections DI 00401.390-DI 00401.41 O; DI 
A00401 .390-DI A00401.410. 
·-··· ···• .. -·· --- - ·-- ·-·-·-·-···----·· .... ············•···········-. ·-. -···· -·-···· .•.. 
[11 This provision does not conflict with, nor negate, the policy stated in SSR 82-63 concerning special "no 
recent or relevant work experience" cases. In such cases a_n individual must be found to have a severe 
impairment(s) (i.e., one which has more than a minimal effect on the person's physical or mental 
ability(ies) to perform basic work activities) in order to be considered under the special provision of that 
Ruling. 
·--·-·············-·-·····--··-··---------------------------
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KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment 
Certiorari Granted by Quast v. Labor Com'n. Utah, December 11, 
2015 
362 P.3d 292 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Rashell QUAST, Petitioner, 
V. 
LABOR COMMISSION, University of 
Utah Huntsman Cancer Hospital, and 
Workers Compensation Fund, Respondents. 
No. 20140559-CA. 
I 
Nov. 12, 2015. 
Synopsis 
Background: Workers' compensation claimant sought 
judicial review of the Labor Commission's denial of her claim 
for pennanent total disability compensation. 
[Holding:] The Court of Appeals, Christiansen, J., held 
that claimant established that she could not perform basic 
work activities without some limitation, thus satisfying the 
limited-ability requirement for permanent total disability 
compensation. 
So ordered. 
West Headnotes (6) 
[1) Workers' Compensation 
<()a;, Amount and period of compensation 
Appellate courts review the Labor Cormnission's 
ultimate finding as to whether workers' 
compensation claimant seeking permanent total 
disability has a limited ability to perform basic 
work activities deferentially, reversing only if 
the finding is not supported by substantial 
evidence. West's U.C.A. § 34A-2-413(l)(c). 
Cases that cite this headnote 
[21 
[3] 
[4) 
[5] 
Workers' Compensation 
{.= In general; questions of law or fact 
Whether the Labor Commission applied 
the correct legal standard in making its 
determination is a question of law, and appellate 
courts review the legal standard applied by 
the Commission for correctness in workers' 
compensation case. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
\¥orkers' Compensation 
€;;;. Incapacity for Work or Employment 
To satisfy the limited-ability element of a 
pennanent total disability claim, the workers' 
compensation claimant need not prove a 
complete inability to perform basic work 
activities, but only that the claimant's ability to 
perform these activities is limited. West's U.C.A. 
§ 34A-2-413(l)(c). 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
Workers' Compensation 
o.. Particular cases in general 
When making permanent total disability 
detennination, Labor Commission should have 
focused on whether workers' compensation 
claimant's disabilities negatively affected her 
ability to perform the basic work activities 
commonly required in employment and not on 
whether her disabilities "reasonably" limited her 
ability to perform basic work activities; claimant 
needed only to establish that her ability to 
perfonn basic work activities was limited, not 
that her limitations were reasonable. 20 C.F.R. § 
404.152l(b)(l); West's U.C.A. § 34A-2-413. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
Workers' Compensation 
oS= Particular cases in general 
Workers' compensation claimant established that 
she could not perfom1 basic work activities 
without some limitation, thus satisfying the 
limited-ability requirement for pennanent total 
disability compensation; claimant's thoracic-
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[6] 
spine injury limited her physical functions 
involving lifting items over 20 pounds and 
bending her spine, claimant's work-related spine 
impainnent impacted her ability to do at least 
some of the work she had done for her entire 
career, and her impaired lifting ability precluded 
claimant from returning to the work for which 
she was qualified at the time of the accident. 20 
C.F.R. § 404.152l(b)(l); West's U.C.A. § 34A-
2-4 L3( I)( c )(ii). 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Workers' Compensation 
~ Incapacity for Work or Employment 
Workers' compensation claimant, seeking 
pem1anent total disability, need only 
demonstrate that her ability to perform basic 
work activities is limited, not that her limitations 
are reasonable or complete. West's U.C.A. § 
34A-2-413(1 )(c). 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
*293 Daniel F. Bertch and Kevin K. Robson, Salt Lake City, 
for Petitioner. 
Hans M. Scheffler, for Respondents University of Utah 
Huntsman Cancer Hospital and Workers Compensation 
Fund. 
Judge MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN authored this 
Memorandum Decision, in which Judges J. FREDERIC 
VOROS JR. and KATE A. TOOMEY concurred. 
Memorandum Decision 
CHRISTIANSEN, Judge: 
,i 1 Rashell QiJ,!!_st seeks judicial review of the Labor 
Commission's denial of her claim for permanent total 
disability compensation. We set aside the Commission's 
decision. 
ii 2 Quast was injured in 2007 while working at the University 
of Utah Huntsman Cancer Hospital when she slipped and 
fell on a wet floor. At the time of the accident, she had a 
preexisting back injury and other medical conditions. The 
accident permanently aggravated her preexisting back injury, 
and she underwent spine surgery in 2008 and in *294 2010. 
Quast has not worked since shortly after her 2008 surgery. 
,i 3 Quast filed a claim for permanent total disability 
(PTD) compensation related to her 2007 accident. After 
an evidentiary hearing, the administrative law judge (the 
ALJ) awarded Quast PTD compensation. On review, the 
Commission vacated that decision and ordered a new hearing 
to take additional medical evidence related to Quast's work 
restrictions. After the second hearing, the ALJ again awarded 
Quast PTD compensation. On review, the Commission again 
reversed the award of PTD compensation. 
,i 4 The Commission found that "Quast suffers from 
various conditions that affect her ability to function." 
The Commission also found that Quasr s thoracic-spine 
impairment "limits [Q1jlj~tj from lifting more than 20 
pounds and from repetitive bending of the spine." The 
Commission nevertheless concluded that ~iiast had failed 
to show that her impairments limit her ability to do basic 
work activities. The Commission explained that Qu.!!~'s' 
preexisting conditions "do not reasonably limit her ability 
to do basic work activities" and that, in spite of the 
physical limitations from her thoracic-spine impairments, 
"she still has a reasonable degree of strength and flexibility." 
The Commission therefore denied .(t~l!~.t!:J claim for PTD 
compensation. ~ua~t petitioned this court for judicial review 
of the Commission's decision. 
[1) [2] ,i 5 Q1ta§! argues that the Commission erred in 
determining that she was not limited in performing basic work 
activities. We review the Commission's "ultimate finding," as 
to whether a claimant has a limited ability to perform basic 
work activities, deferentially, reversing only if the finding is 
not supported by substantial evidence. Provo City v. Labor 
Comm'n, 2015 UT 32, ,i,i 12-13, 345 P.3d 1242. But whether 
the Commission applied the correct legal standard in making 
its determination is a question oflaw, and we review the legal 
standard applied by the Commission for correctness. A & B 
Mech. Contractors v. Labor Comm'n, 2013 UT App 230, ·,i 
15,311P.3d528. 
11 6 Quast argues that the Commission's finding that she was 
not limited in her ability to perform basic work activities 
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misinterprets the statutory language of Uiah Code section 
34A-2-4 I 3. To demonstrate a pennanent total disability, a 
claimant must demonstrate, among other things, that she has 
"an impairment or combination of impairments that limit 
the [claimaint's] ability to do basic work activities." Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(1 )(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2014). 
Quast argues that "limit" in this context means only "that the 
medical impairment places a limitation on work ability" and 
that her thoracic-spine injury "has placed a s ignificant limit 
on her ability to do [basic work activities]"-i.e. , bending and 
lifting. 
[3) , 7 To satisfy the limited-ability element of a PTD claim, 
the claimant "need not prove a complete inability to perform 
basic work activities, [but] only that the [claimant's] ability to 
perform these activities is limited." Provo City, 2015 UT 32,, 
28, 345 P.3d 1242. Because "basic work activities" are those 
" 'abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs,' " the 
claimant's impairments "must limit [the claimaint's) ability 
to perform the work activities of a broad spectrum of jobs 
available." Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521 (b) (2008)). In 
Provo City, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the Commission's 
decision to award PTD compensation to a former facility 
service technician because the evidence presented to the 
Commission was sufficient to establish that the claimant's 
impairments "negatively affect[ ed] his ability to perform" 
even in "more sedentary" and "less physically demanding 
jobs, such as office work." Id.,, 29-30. In other words, there 
was substantial evidence from which the Commission could 
find that the claimant's injury "limited his ability to perfonn 
basic work activities that would be required for most jobs." 
Id., 30. 
, 8 Recently, this· court decided Oliver v. Labor Commission, 
2015 UT App 225, wherein we explained the scope of the 
inquiry required of the Commission in evaluating whether an 
impairment limits a claimant's ability to perform basic work 
activities: 
[T]he Workers' Compensation Act. does not direct the 
Commission to detennine whether the claimant has 
reasonable levels of functionality or a reasonable ability 
to *295 perform basic work activities. Rather, it requires 
the Commission to consider whether a claimant's "ability 
to perform these activities is limited." Thus, evaluating 
whether a claimant retains a reasonable degree of physical 
and mental functionality notwithstanding a disability has 
no place in this analysis because the basic-work-activities 
analysis begins and ends with evaluating whether the 
claimant's disability "negatively affects" the ability to 
perform the basic work activities commonly required in 
employment. 
Id. ~I 1 1 ( citations omitted) ( emphasis added). 
14] , 9 Our analysis in Oliver is dispositive here. 
The Commission found that "Quast suffers from various 
conditions that affect her ability to function" and that Quast's 
thoracic-spine impainnent "limits [her] from lifting more 
than 20 pounds and from repetitive bending of the spine." 
Moreover, it found that Quast was limited to the "light 
physical demand category of jobs." In accordance with 
Oliver, the Commission should have focused only on whether 
these disabilities "negatively affect[ ] [Q1,1ast's] ability to 
perfonn the basic work activities commonly required in 
employment." See id. (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.152l(b)(l) (2008) (giving 
as examples of basic work activities "[p]hysical functions 
such as ... lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying or 
handling"). There is no qualitative restriction before a finding 
of"limited" can be made. 
[SJ , IO The Commission's conclusion that ~ast~  post-
2007 disabilities did not "reasonably" limit her ability to 
perfonn basic work activities because she retained "good 
functional capacity" are inconsistent with the statutory 
language, our supreme court's guidance in Provo City, and 
our recent decision in Oliver. !l.1!ill need only demonstrate 
that her ability to perform basic work activities is limited, 
not that such a limitation is "reasonable." See Provo City, 
20 15 UT 32,, 28, 345 P.3d 1242; Oliver, 2015 UT App 
225, , 11, 359 P.3d 684 (observing that the Commission's 
use of the qualifying tenn "reasonable" imposed a higher 
burden on the claimant than that dictated by statute and 
that the Commission therefore misconstrued the governing 
legal standard). The Commission's findings demonstrate that 
Q•.f~st'$ thoracic-spine injury limits her physical functions 
involving lifting items over twenty pounds and bending her 
spine. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b)(l). And the findings 
demonstrate that ~ i;[ii§~ "work-related spine impairment 
impacts her ability to do at least some of the work she 
has done for her entire career" and that "her impaired 
lifting ability precludes [~!JJll"fj from returning to the work 
for which she was qualified at the time of the accident." 
Moreover, the Commission detennined that while there may 
be some housekeeping work that Quas~ can perform despite 
her restrictions against repetitive bending of the spine, her 
employer failed to prove that there was other work reasonably 
available to Q.ii~st. 
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16] ~ 11 To prove her entitlement to pennanent total 
disability compensation, Quast need only establish that her 
"abili ty to perform [basic work] activities is limited," not 
that her limitations are "reasonable" or "complete." Here, 
the evidence indicates that Quast cannot perfom1 basic work 
activities without some limitation, thus satisfying the limited-
ability requirement for PTO compensation under section 
34A- 2-4 l 3( 1 )( c )(ii) of the Utah Code. The Commission's 
contrary determinations as to whether Quast was limited 
in her ability to do basic work activities were based on 
an incorrect legal standard. We therefore set aside the 
Commission's ruling and allow the ALJ's order to stand. 
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